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Abstract
This thesis studies the product sharing manifestation of the sharing and on-
demand economy. It consists of two essays, one on peer-to-peer (P2P) product
sharing and the other on business-to-consumer (B2C) product sharing.
The first essay describes an equilibrium model of P2P sharing or collaborative
consumption, where individuals with varying usage levels make decisions about
whether or not to own a product. Owners are able to generate income from renting
their products to non-owners while non-owners are able to access these products
through renting on as needed basis. We characterize equilibrium outcomes, in-
cluding ownership and usage levels, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We
compare each outcome in systems with and without collaborative consumption.
Our findings indicate that collaborative consumption can result in either lower or
higher ownership and usage levels, with higher ownership and usage levels more
likely when the cost of ownership is high. Our findings also indicate that con-
sumers always benefit from collaborative consumption, with individuals who, in
the absence of collaborative consumption, are indifferent between owning and not
owning benefitting the most. We study both profit maximizing and social welfare
maximizing platforms and compare equilibrium outcomes under both in terms of
ownership, usage, and social welfare. We find that a not-for-profit platform would
always charge a lower price and, therefore, lead to lower ownership and usage than
a for-profit platform. We also examine the robustness of our results by considering
several extensions to our model.
i
The second essay characterizes the optimal inventory repositioning policy for
a class of B2C product sharing networks. We consider a B2C product sharing
network with a fixed number of rental units distributed across multiple locations.
The units are accessed by customers without prior reservation and on an on-
demand basis. Customers are provided with the flexibility to decide on how long
to keep a unit and where to return it. Because of the randomness in demand,
rental periods and return locations, there is a need to periodically reposition
inventory away from some locations and into others. In deciding on how much
inventory to reposition and where, the system manager balances potential lost
sales with repositioning costs. We formulate the problem into a Markov decision
process and show that the problem in each period is one that involves solving a
convex optimization problem. The optimal policy in each period can be described
in terms of a well-specified region over the state space. Within this region, it is
optimal not to reposition any inventory while, outside the region, it is optimal
to reposition some inventory but only such that the system moves to a new state
that is on the boundary of the no-repositioning region. We provide a simple check
for when a state is in the no-repositioning region, which also allows us to compute
the optimal policy more efficiently.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We are witnessing, across a wide range of domains, a shift away from the exclu-
sive ownership and planned consumption of resources to one of shared use and
on-demand consumption. This shift is taking advantage of technological develop-
ment such as online marketplaces and mediation platforms. Value is derived from
the fact that many resources are acquired to satisfy infrequent demand but are
otherwise poorly utilized (for example, the average car in the US is used less than
5 percent of the time). Several successful businesses in the US and elsewhere,
such as Turo for cars, Nice Ride for bikes, Style Lend for designer clothing, 3D
Hubs for 3D printers, Uber for transportation services, TaskRabbit for errands
and Postmates for courier services, provide a proof of concept and evidence of
viability for the shared and on-demand access to products and services. Collec-
tively, these businesses and others are giving rise to what is becoming known as
the sharing and on-demand economy.
1
2The term sharing economy refers to the economic activities in which partici-
pants share the access to products and services through online market places. It
encompasses product sharing platforms such as Turo, 3D Hubs and Nice Ride, as
well as service sharing platforms such as Uber, TaskRabbit and Postmates.1 A
common feature of these platforms is the ability to fulfill consumer demand via
the immediate provisioning of products and services. Economic activities with
this feature are referred to as the on-demand economy. In this thesis, we focus on
the product sharing aspect of the sharing and on-demand economy.
Product sharing is not a new concept. However, recent technological advances
in several areas have made it more feasible by lowering the associated search and
transaction costs. These advances include the development of online marketplaces,
mobile devices and platforms, electronic payments, and two-way reputation sys-
tems whereby users rate providers and providers rate users. Other drivers behind
the rise of product sharing are societal and include increased population density in
urban areas around the world, increased concern about the environment (product
sharing is viewed as a more sustainable alternative to traditional modes of con-
sumption), increased desire for convenience, and increased desire for community
and altruism among the young and educated.
Product sharing can in general be classified into two catergories, peer-to-peer
(P2P) product sharing and business-to-consumer (B2C) product sharing. P2P
product sharing enables the peer-to-peer rental of products, whereby owners rent
1Service sharing platforms often employ self-scheduled workers, and focus on how the supply
and demand of services are affected by the prices and wages, and how the choices of these prices
and wages affect customer delay and platform profit. For a discussion of these platforms, see
Gurvich et al. [2015]; Taylor [2016]; Cachon et al. [2015]; Banerjee et al. [2015] and the references
therein.
3on a short-term basis poorly utilized assets to non-owners and non-owners access
these assets through renting on an as-needed basis. The platform in P2P prod-
uct sharing does not own the products, but serves to facilitate the transactions
between owners and renters. P2P product sharing has the potential of increasing
access while reducing investments in resources and infrastructure. In turn, this
could have the twin benefit of improving consumer welfare (individuals who may
not otherwise afford a product now have an opportunity to use it) while reducing
societal costs (externalities, such as pollution that may be associated with the
production, distribution, use, and disposal of the product). Take cars for exam-
ple. The availability of sharing could lead some to forego car ownership in favor
of on-demand access. In turn, this could result in a corresponding reduction in
congestion and emissions and, eventually, in reduced investments in roads and
parking infrastructure. However, increased sharing may have other consequences,
some of which may be undesirable. For example, greater access to cars could
increase car usage and, therefore, lead to more congestion and pollution if it is
not accompanied by a sufficient reduction in the number of cars.2
P2P product sharing raises several important questions. How does P2P prod-
uct sharing affect ownership and usage of products? Is it necessarily the case that
P2P product sharing leads to lower ownership, lower usage, or both (and therefore
to improved environmental impact)? If not, what conditions would favor lower
2An article in the New York Times (Board [2015]) notes that “The average daytime speed of cars
in Manhattan’s business districts has fallen to just under 8 miles per hour this year, from about
9.15 miles per hour in 2009. City officials say that car services like Uber and Lyft are partly to
blame. So Mayor Bill de Blasio is proposing to cap their growth.” A recent study by KPMG
(Korosec [2015]) projects a significant increase in miles driven by cars due to increased usage of
on-demand transportation services by two ends of the population demographic spectrum, the
very young (children and teenagers) and the old.
4ownership, lower usage, or both? Who benefits the most from collaborative con-
sumption among owners and renters? To what extent would a profit maximizing
platform, through its choice of rental prices, improve social welfare? To what ex-
tent do frictions, such as extra wear and tear renters place on rented products and
inconvenience experienced by owners affect platform profit and social welfare?
In Chapter 2, we address these and other related questions. We describe an
equilibrium model of peer-to-peer product sharing, where individuals with vary-
ing usage levels make decisions about whether or not to own. In the presence
of collaborative consumption, owners are able to generate income from renting
their products to non-owners while non-owners are able to access these products
through renting. The matching of owners and renters is facilitated by a platform,
which sets the rental price and charges a commission fee. We characterize equi-
librium outcomes, including ownership and usage levels, consumer surplus, and
social welfare. Our findings indicate that, depending on the rental price, collabo-
rative consumption can result in either lower or higher ownership and usage levels,
with higher ownership and usage levels more likely when the cost of ownership is
high. Our findings also indicate that consumers always benefit from collaborative
consumption, with individuals who, in the absence of collaborative consumption,
are indifferent between owning and not owning benefitting the most. We show
that these results continue to hold in settings where the rental price is determined
by either a for-profit (profit maximizing) or a not-for-profit (social welfare max-
imizing) platform. We find that a not-for-profit platform would always charge a
lower price and, therefore, lead to lower ownership and usage than a for-profit
platform. We also examine the robustness of our results by considering several
5extensions to our model.
B2C product sharing, on the other hand, is on-demand product rental in dis-
guise. Like other on-demand businesses, it improves upon traditional product
rental by providing consumers with cashless and cashier-less service experience
and 24 by 7 access to products with more flexible rental periods at more conve-
nient locations. The most innovative B2C sharing businesses allow their customers
to pick up a product without reservation and, to keep the product for one or more
periods without committing to a specific return time or location. Systems with
these features include Redbox for disc rental, Nice Ride for bike sharing and Zip-
car for car sharing (Point-to-point car sharing programs such as Car2go can also
be treated as location based, with each location being either a neighborhood, a
city block, or a public parking lot). When operated at a high service level, B2C
product sharing provides a level of freedom that is highly sought after by con-
sumers.3 However, due to the constant flow of products between locations, such a
system can become quickly imbalanced and, therefore, requires periodic inventory
repositioning to effectively match supply and demand.
Although the problem is common in practice, and carries significant economic
costs for the affected firms and their customers, the existing literature on this
topic is relatively limited. In particular, how to manage these systems optimally
3Due to these value-added features, product sharing has been well received by both consumers
and service providers. Take car sharing for example, the global car sharing members increased
from 346, 610 to 4, 842, 616 from 2006 to 2014 (a 40% annual growth rate), and the corresponding
fleet size grew from 11, 501 to 104, 125 (a 32% annual growth rate). See Shaheen and Cohen
[2016]. By 2015, Hertz, Avis Budget and Enterprise, who control 95% of the car rental market
in North America and a sizeable market elsewhere, all have acquired their own car sharing
businesses (Zipcar by Avis Budget, Enterprise CarShare by Enterprise, and Hertz 24/7 by
Hertz).
6is, to the best of our knowledge, not known. Moreover, there does not appear to
be efficient methods for computing the optimal policy for systems as general as
the one we consider in this research, including effective heuristics. This relative
lack of results appears to be due to the multidimensional nature of the problem
as well as the lost sales feature, compounded by the presence of randomness in
demand, rental periods and return locations.
In Chapter 3, we address some of these limitations. We focus on the Redbox
model, where rental periods are longer than review periods. We formulate the
problem as a Markov decision process and show that the problem to be solved
in each period is one that involves solving a convex optimization problem. More
significantly, we show that the optimal policy in each period can be described
in terms of two well-specified regions over the state space. If the system is in a
state that falls within one region, it is optimal not to reposition any inventory
(we refer to this region as the “no-repositioning” region). If the system is in a
state that is outside this region, it is optimal to reposition some inventory but
only such that the system moves to a new state that is on the boundary of the
no-repositioning region. Moreover, we provide a simple check for when a state is
in the no-repositioning region, which also allows us to compute the optimal policy
more efficiently.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide treat-
ment for P2P product sharing. In chapter 3, we address the inventory reposition-
ing problem in B2C product sharing. In Chapter 4, we offer concluding comments
and discuss plans for future research.
Chapter 2
Peer-to-Peer Product Sharing:
Implications for Ownership,
Usage and Social Welfare
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe an equilibrium model of peer-to-peer product sharing
or collaborative consumption, where individuals with varying usage levels make
decisions about whether or not to own a homogenous product. In the presence
of collaborative consumption, owners are able to generate income from renting
their products to non-owners while non-owners are able to access these products
through renting. The matching of owners and renters is facilitated by a platform,
7
8which sets the rental price and charges a commission fee.1 Because supply and
demand can fluctuate over the short run, we allow for the possibility that an owner
may not always be able to find a renter when she puts her product up for rent.
Similarly, we allow for the possibility that a renter may not always be able to find
a product to rent when he needs one. We refer to the uncertainty regarding the
availability of renters and products as matching friction and describe a model for
this uncertainty. We also account for the cost incurred by owners due to the extra
wear and tear that a renter places on a rented product and for the inconvenience
cost experienced by renters for using a product that is not their own.
For a given price and a commission rate, we characterize equilibrium owner-
ship and usage levels, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We compare each in
systems with and without collaborative consumption and examine the impact of
various problem parameters including price, commission rate, cost of ownership,
extra wear and tear cost, and inconvenience cost. We also do so when the price is
a decision made by the platform to maximize either profit or social welfare. Our
main findings include the following:
 Depending on the rental price, we show that collaborative consumption can
result in either higher or lower ownership. In particular, we show that when
the rental price is sufficiently high (above a well-specified threshold), collab-
orative consumption leads to higher ownership. We show that this threshold
1A variety of pricing approaches are observed in practice. Some platforms allow owners to choose
their own prices. Others (e.g., DriveMycar) determine the price. There are also cases where
the approach is hybrid, with owners determining a minimum acceptable price but allowing
the platform to adjust it higher (e.g., Turo), or with the platform suggesting a price (e.g.,
JustShareIt) but allowing owners to deviate. From conversations the authors had with several
industry executives, there appears to be a push toward platform pricing, with several platforms
investing in the development of sophisticated pricing engines to support owners.
9is decreasing in the cost of ownership. That is, collaborative consumption
is more likely to lead to more ownership when the cost of ownership is high
(this is because collaborative consumption allows individuals to offset the
high ownership cost and pulls in a segment of the population that may not
otherwise choose to own).
 Similarly, we show that collaborative consumption can lead to either higher
or lower usage, with usage being higher when price is sufficiently high. Thus,
it is possible for collaborative consumption to result in both higher ownership
and higher usage (it is also possible for ownership to be lower but usage to
be higher and for both ownership and usage to be lower).
 These results continue to hold in settings where the rental price is deter-
mined by a profit maximizing or a social welfare maximizing platform. In
particular, collaborative consumption can still lead to either higher or lower
ownership and usage with higher ownership and usage more likely when the
cost of ownership is higher.
 We show that consumers always benefit from collaborative consumption,
with individuals who, in the absence of collaborative consumption, are indif-
ferent between owning and not owning benefitting the most. This is because
among non-owners those with the most usage (and therefore end up rent-
ing the most) benefit the most from collaborative consumption. Similarly,
among owners, those with the least usage (and therefore end up earning the
most rental income) benefit the most.
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 For a profit maximizing platform, we show that profit is not monotonic in
the cost of ownership, implying that a platform is least profitable when the
cost of ownership is either very high or very low (those two extremes lead to
scenarios with either mostly renters and few owners or mostly owners and
few renters). The platform is most profitable when owners and renters are
sufficiently balanced. For similar reasons, social welfare is also highest when
owners and renters are sufficiently balanced.
 We observe that platform profit is also not monotonic in the extra wear and
tear renters place on a rented product, implying that a platform may not
always have an incentive to reduce this cost. This is because the platform
can leverage this cost to induce desirable ownership levels without resorting
to extreme pricing, which can be detrimental to its revenue.
 We examine the robustness of our results by considering settings, among
others, where (1) non-owners have the option of renting from a third party
service provider, (2) platforms may own assets of their own, (3) individuals
are heterogeneous in their aversion to renting to/from others (i.e., their
sensitivity to the costs of extra wear and tear and inconvenience), (4) usage
is endogenous, and (5) usage has a general distribution.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide a
review of related literature. In Section 2.3, we describe our model. In Section
2.4, we provide an analysis of the equilibrium. In Section 2.5, we consider the
platform’s problem. In Section 2.6, we discuss extensions.
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2.2 Related Literature
Our work is related to the literature on two-sided markets (see for example Rochet
and Tirole [2006]; Weyl [2010]; and Hagiu and Wright [2015]). Examples of two-
sided markets include social media platforms which bring together members and
advertisers or operating systems for computers and smart phones, which connect
users and application developers. A common feature of two-sided markets is that
the utility of individuals on each side of the market increases with the size of the
other side of the market. As a result, it can be beneficial for the platform to
heavily subsidize one side of the market (e.g., social media sites are typically free
to members). Collaborative consumption is different from two-sided markets in
several ways, the most important of which is that the two sides are not distinct.
In collaborative consumption, being either an owner or a renter is a decision that
users of the platform make, with more owners implying fewer renters, and vice-
versa. Therefore, heavily subsidizing one side of the market may not necessarily
be desirable as it can create an imbalance in the supply and demand for the shared
resource.
Our work is also related to the literature on servicization. Servicization refers
to a business model under which a firm that supplies a product to the market
retains ownership of the product and instead charges customers per use (e.g.,
printer manufacturers charging customers per printed page instead of charging
them for the purchase of a printer or car manufacturers renting cars on a short term
basis instead of selling them or leasing them on a long term basis). Agrawal and
Bellos [2016] examine the extent to which servicization affects ownership and usage
12
and the associated environmental impact.2 Orsdemir et al. [2017] evaluate both
the profitability and the environmental impact of servicization. Bellos et al. [2013]
study the economic and environmental implications of an auto manufacturer, in
addition to selling cars, offering a car sharing service. Additional discussion and
examples of servicization can be found in Agrawal and Bellos [2016] and the
references therein. Peer-to-peer product sharing is different from servicization
in that there is no single entity that owns the rental units, with owners being
simultaneously consumers and suppliers of the market. As a result, the payoff of
one side of the market depends on the availability of the other side. This, coupled
with the fact that supply and demand are not guaranteed to be matched with
each other, makes ownership and usage decisions more complicated than those
under servicization.
There is a growing body of literature on peer-to-peer markets (see Einav et al.
[2016] for a recent review). Within this literature, there is a small but growing
stream that deals with peer-to-peer markets with collaborative consumption fea-
tures. Fradkin et al. [2015] studies sources of inefficiency in matching buyers and
suppliers in online market places. Using a counterfactual study, they show how
changes to the ranking algorithm of Airbnb can improve the rate at which buyers
are successfully matched with suppliers. Zervas et al. [2015] examine the relation-
ship between Airbnb supply and hotel room revenue and find that an increase
2Under a servicization model, the firm can exert costly effort to improve certain characteristics
of the product such as its energy efficiency during use or its durability. This could lower the
corresponding operating costs, which in turn could result in higher usage. The phenomenon
of higher efficiency leading to more usage is commonly referred to as the rebound effect. See
Greening et al. [2000] for an overview and references. In our setting, the introduction of
collaborative consumption can lead, under some conditions, to higher ownership because of the
rental income owners derive from ownership.
13
in Airbnb supply has only a modest negative impact on hotel revenue. Cullen
and Farronato [2014] describe a model of peer-to-peer labor marketplaces. They
calibrate the model using data from TaskRabbit and find that supply is highly
elastic, with increases in demand matched by increases in supply per worker with
little or no impact on price.
Papers that are closest in spirit to ours are Fraiberger and Sundararajan [2016]
and Jiang and Tian [2016]. Fraiberger and Sundararajan [2016] describe a dy-
namic programing model where individuals make decisions in each period regard-
ing whether to purchase a new car, purchase a used a car, or not purchase any-
thing. They model matching friction, as we do, but assume that the renter-owner
matching probabilities are exogenously specified and not affected by the ratio of
owners to renters (in our case, we allow for these to depend on the ratio of owners
to renters which turns out to be critical in the decisions of individuals on whether
to own or rent). They use the model to carry out a numerical study. For the
parameter values they consider, they show that collaborative consumption leads
to a reduction in new and used car ownership, an increase in the fraction of the
population who do not own, and an increase in the usage intensity per vehicle.
In this paper, we show that ownership and usage can actually either increase or
decrease with collaborative consumption and provide analytical results regarding
conditions under which different combinations of outcomes can occur. We also
study the decision of the platform regarding pricing and the impact of various
parameters on platform profitability.
Jiang and Tian [2016] describe a two-period model, where individuals first de-
cide on whether or not to own a product. This is followed by owners deciding in
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each period on whether to use the product themselves or rent it. They assume
that demand always matches supply through a market clearing price and do not
consider, as we do, the possibility of a mismatch, because of matching friction,
between supply and demand. They focus on the decision of the product manu-
facturer. In particular, they study how the manufacturer should choose its retail
price and product quality in anticipation of sharing by consumers. In contrast,
we focus on the decision of the platform which in our case decides on the rental
price.
Empirical studies that examine the impact of peer-to-peer product sharing on
ownership and usage are scarce. Clark et al. [2014] present results from a survey
of British users of a peer-to-peer car sharing service. They find that peer-to-peer
car sharing has led to a net increase in the number of miles driven by car renters.
Linden and Franciscus [2016] examine differences in the prevalence of peer-to-
peer car sharing among several European cities. He finds that peer-to-peer car
sharing is more prevalent in cities where a larger share of trips is taken by public
transport and where there is a city center less suitable for car use. Ballus-Armet
et al. [2014] report on a survey in San Francisco of public perception of peer-to-
peer car sharing. They find that approximately 25% of surveyed car owners would
be willing to share their personal vehicles through peer-to-peer car sharing, with
liability and trust concerns being the primary deterrents. They also find that
those who drive almost every day are less likely to rent through peer-to-peer car
sharing, while those who use public transit at least once per week are more likely
to do so. There are a few studies that consider car sharing that involves a third
party service provider, such as a car rental company. For example, Nijland et al.
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[2015] (and also Martin and Shaheen [2011]) find that car sharing would lead to
a net decrease in car usage. On the other hand, a study by KPMG (Korosec
[2015]) projects a significant increase in miles driven by cars and attributes this
to increased usage of on-demand transportation services. In general, there does
not appear to be a consensus yet on the impact of car sharing on car usage and
ownership. Our paper, by providing a framework for understanding how various
factors may affect product sharing outcomes, could be useful in informing future
empirical studies.
2.3 Model Description
In this section, we describe our model of collaborative consumption. The model
is applicable to the case of peer to peer product sharing where owners make their
products available for rent when they are not using them and non-owners can
rent from owners to fulfill their usage needs. We reference the case of car sharing.
However, the model applies more broadly to the collaborative consumption of
other products. We consider a population of individuals who are heterogeneous in
their product usage, with their type characterized by their usage level ξ. We as-
sume usage is exogenously determined (i.e., the usage of each individual is mostly
inflexible). In Section 2.6.4, we consider the case where usage is endogenously
determined and affected by the presence of collaborative consumption. We as-
sume that the utility derived by an individual with type ξ, u(ξ) is linear in ξ with
u(ξ) = ξ. We use a linear utility for ease of exposition and to allow for closed
form expressions. A linear utility has constant returns to scale, and, without loss
16
of generality, the utility derived from each unit of usage can be normalized to 1.
Also without loss of generality, we normalize the usage level to [0, 1], where ξ = 0
corresponds to no usage at all and ξ = 1 to full usage. We let f(ξ) denote the
density function of the usage distribution in the population.
We assume products are homogeneous in their features, quality, and cost of
ownership. In the absence of collaborative consumption, each individual makes a
decision about whether or not to own. In the presence of collaborative consump-
tion, each individual decides on whether to own, rent from others who own, or
neither. Owners incur the fixed cost of ownership but can now generate income
by renting their products to others who choose not to own. Renters pay the rental
fee but avoid the fixed cost of ownership.
We let p denote the rental price per unit of usage that renters pay (a uniform
price is consistent with observed practices by certain peer-to-peer platforms when
the goods are homogenous). This rental price may be set by a third party platform
(an entity that may be motivated by profit, social welfare, or some other concern;
see Section 5 for further discussion). The platform extracts a commission from
successful transactions, which we denote by γ, where 0 ≤ γ < 1, so that the
rental income seen by the owner per unit of usage is (1 − γ)p. We let α, where
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 denote the fraction of time in equilibrium that an owner, whenever
she puts her product up for rent, is successful in finding a renter. Similarly, we
denote by β, where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, fraction of time that a renter, whenever he decides
to rent, is successful in finding an available product (the parameters α and β are
determined endogenously in equilibrium). A renter resorts to his outside option
(e.g., public transport in the case of cars) whenever he is not successful in finding
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a product to rent. The owner incurs a fixed cost of ownership, denoted by c, which
may include not just the purchase cost (if costs are expressed per unit time, this
cost would be amortized accordingly) but also other ownership-related costs such
as those related to storage and insurance. Whenever the product is rented, the
owner incurs an additional cost, denoted by do, due to extra wear and tear the
renter places on the product. Renters, on the other hand, incur an inconvenience
cost, denoted by dr (in addition to paying the rental fee), from using someone
else’s product and not their own. Without loss of generality, we assume that
c, p, do, dr ∈ [0, 1] and normalize the value of the outside option (e.g., using public
transport) to 0.
We assume that p(1− γ) ≥ do so that an owner would always put her product
out for rent when she is not using it. Note that usage corresponds to the portion
of time an owner would like to have access to her product, regardless of whether or
not she is actually using it. An owner has always priority in accessing her product.
Hence her usage can always be fulfilled. We also assume that p + dr ≤ 1 so that
a renter always prefers renting to the outside option. Otherwise, rentals would
never take place as the outside option is assumed to be always available. There
are of course settings where an individual would like to use a mix of options (e.g.,
different transportation methods). In that case, ξ corresponds to the portion of
usage that an individual prefers to fulfill using the product (e.g., a car and not
public transport).
The payoff of an owner with usage level ξ can now be expressed as
pio(ξ) = ξ + (1− ξ)α[(1− γ)p− do]− c, (2.1)
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while the payoff of a renter as
pir(ξ) = βξ − β(p+ dr)ξ. (2.2)
The payoff of an owner has three terms: the utility derived from usage, the income
derived from renting (net of the wear and tear cost), and the cost of ownership.
The income from renting is realized only when the owner is able to find a renter.
The payoff of a renter is the difference between the utility derived from renting
and the cost of renting (the sum of rental price and inconvenience cost). A renter
derives utility and incurs costs whenever he is successful in renting a product.
An individual with type ξ would participate in collaborative consumption as
an owner if the following conditions are satisfied
pio(ξ) ≥ pir(ξ) and pio(ξ) ≥ 0.
The first constraint ensures that an individual who chooses to be an owner prefers
to be an owner to being a renter. The second constraint is a participation con-
straint that ensures the individual participates in collaborative consumption. Sim-
ilarly, an individual with type ξ would participate in collaborative consumption
as a renter if the following conditions are satisfied
pir(ξ) ≥ pio(ξ) and pir(ξ) ≥ 0.
Noting that, for any given pair of α and β in [0, 1], pio(ξ)−pir(ξ) is monotonically
increasing and pir(ξ) ≥ 0 for ξ ∈ [0, 1], collaborative consumption would take place
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if there exists θ ∈ (0, 1) such that
pio(θ) = pir(θ). (2.3)
The parameter θ would then segment the population into owners and renters,
where individuals with ξ > θ are owners and individuals with ξ < θ are renters
(an individual with ξ = θ is indifferent between owning and renting). We refer to
ω =
∫
[θ,1]
f(ξ) dξ,
the fraction of owners in the population, as the ownership level or simply owner-
ship. In addition, we refer to
q(θ) =
∫
[θ,1]
ξf(ξ) dξ + β
∫
[0,θ]
ξf(ξ) dξ,
the total usage generated from the population, as the usage level or simply usage.
Note that the first term is usage due to owners, and the second term is usage due
to renters (and hence modulated by β).
2.3.1 Matching Supply with Demand
In the presence of collaborative consumption, let D(θ) denote the aggregate de-
mand (for rentals) generated by renters and S(θ) the aggregate supply generated
by owners, for given θ. Then,
D(θ) =
∫
[0,θ)
ξf(ξ) dξ
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and
S(θ) =
∫
[θ,1]
(1− ξ)f(ξ) dξ.
Moreover, the amount of demand from renters that is fulfilled must equal the
amount of supply from owners that is matched with renters. In other words, the
following fundamental relationship must be satisfied
αS(θ) = βD(θ). (2.4)
The parameters α and β, along with θ, are determined endogenously in equilib-
rium.
As mentioned earlier, matching friction can arise because of short term fluctua-
tions in supply and demand (even though overall supply and demand are constant
in the long run). This short term fluctuation may be due to the inherent vari-
ability in the timing of individual rental requests or in the duration of individual
rental periods. Consequently, an available product may not find an immediate
renter and a renter may not always be able to find an available product. In con-
structing a model for α and β, the following are desirable properties: (i) α (β)
increases (deceases) in θ; (ii) α approaches 1 (0) when θ approaches 1 (0); (iii)
β approaches 1 (0) when θ approaches 0 (1), and (iv) α and β must satisfy the
supply-demand relationship in (2.4).
Below we describe a plausible model for the short term dynamics of matching
owners and renters. This model is by no means unique and in Appendix 2.C we
describe an alternative approach to model these dynamics. The model takes the
view that in the short term (e.g., over the course of a day) demand is not realized
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all at once but requests for rentals arise continuously over time with random
interarrival times. The intensity of the arrival process is of course determined
by the total demand (e.g., total demand per day). The supply translates into
individual products available for rent (for simplicity assume that supply is realized
all at once and does not fluctuate over the time during which rental requests
arrive). Once a product is rented, it becomes unavailable for the duration of
the rental time, which may also be random. Because of the randomness in the
interarrival times between requests and rental times per request, a request may
arrive and find all products rented out. Assuming renters do not wait for a product
to become available, such a request would then go unfulfilled. Also, because of
this randomness, a product may not be rented all the time even if total demand
exceeds total supply.
The dynamics described above are similar to those of a multi-server loss queue-
ing system3. In such a system, 1−β would correspond to the blocking probability
(the probability that a rental request finds all products rented out, or, in queueing
parlance, the arrival of a request finds all servers busy) while α would correspond
to the utilization of the servers (the probability that a product is being rented
out).
If we let m denote the mean rental time per rental, the arrival rate (in terms
of rental requests per unit time) is given by λ(θ) = D(θ)
m
, and service capacity
3In a multi-server loss queueing system, customers arrive over time to receive service from a set
of identical servers. A customer who does not find an available server upon arrival leaves the
system without getting service. A customer who finds one or more available servers proceeds
to receive service from one of these servers. Service takes a specified amount of time. Upon
completion of service, the corresponding server becomes available. Both the interarrival and
service times can be stochastic. (See Cooper [1981] for additional details).
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(the number of rental requests that can be fulfilled per unit time) by µ(θ) =
S(θ)
m
.4 Therefore, we can express the workload (the ratio of the arrival rate to
the service capacity) of the system as ρ(θ) = λ(θ)
µ(θ)
= D(θ)
S(θ)
and the utilization as
α = βλ(θ)
µ(θ)
= βD(θ)
S(θ)
(these relationships are of course consistent with the supply-
demand relationship in (2.4)).
Let k denote the number of servers (as it turns out, we do not have to compute
k explicitly as the approximation we end up using to estimate α and β depends
only on the workload ρ(θ)). Then, assuming we can approximate the arrival
process by a Poisson process, the blocking probability B(ρ, k)(= 1 − β) is given
by the Erlang loss formula (see for example Sevastyanov [1957])
B(ρ, k) =
(kρ)k
k!∑k
n=0
(kρ)n
n!
.
Unfortunately the above expression is not easily amenable to mathematical analy-
sis. Therefore, in what follows we consider approximations that are more tractable
yet retain the desirable properties (i)-(iv).
Sobel [1980] provides the following lower and upper bounds for the blocking
probability:
(1− 1
ρ
)+ ≤ B(ρ, k) ≤ 1− 1
1 + ρ
.
Both the lower and upper bounds arise from approximations. The lower bound is
obtained from a deterministic fluid approximation where B(ρ, k) = 0 if D(θ) ≤
4For example, suppose the aggregate demand for renting per unit time is D(θ) = 1000 hours and
the aggregate supply for renting per unit time is S(θ) = 2000 hours. If the average rental period
is m = 5 hours, then the arrival rate and the service capacity of the system are respectively
λ(θ) = D(θ)/m = 200 and µ(θ) = S(θ)/m = 400 requests per unit time.
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S(θ) and B(ρ, k) = 1− S(θ)/D(θ) otherwise. This leads to the following approx-
imation of β and α
β = min{1
ρ
, 1} = min{ S(θ)
D(θ)
, 1},
and
α = min{ρ, 1} = min{D(θ)
S(θ)
, 1}.
Clearly, these approximations are upper bounds on the exact matching probabil-
ities and therefore overestimate these probabilities (this is not surprising given
that these matching probabilities are those of a deterministic system). Note also
that at least one of these expressions is one, so that α + β > 1. This is perhaps
reasonable when short term fluctuations in supply and demand are insignificant
and friction arises only from the fact that, in equilibrium, either supply can ex-
ceed demand or vice-versa. However, these approximations are in contrast with
the empirical evidence that α and β can be simultaneously less than one.5
The upper bound arises from approximating the multi-server system by a single
server system with an equivalent service capacity. This leads to the following
approximation of β and α
β =
1
1 + ρ
=
S(θ)
S(θ) +D(θ)
, (2.5)
and
α =
ρ
1 + ρ
=
D(θ)
S(θ) +D(θ)
. (2.6)
These approximations are lower bounds on the the exact matching probabilities
5Using data from Getaround, Fraiberger and Sundararajan [2016] estimate the matching prob-
abilities, for the case study they consider, to be α = 0.1 and β = 0.6 (self reported values based
on a survey of Getaround users put the estimated β at a slightly higher value of 0.85).
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and therefore underestimate these probabilities. Note that in this case α+β = 1.
Interestingly, these expressions can be obtained directly from the supply-demand
relationship in (2.4) if we require that α + β = 1 (the above expressions are in
that case the unique solution to (2.4)).
Both of the upper and lower bound approximations satisfy properties (i)-(iv)
described above. However, the approximations in (2.5) and (2.6) allow for both
α and β to be strictly less than one and for the possibility of matching friction
for both owners and renters. Therefore, in the rest of the chapter, we rely on this
approximation for our analysis. We are nonetheless able to confirm that all the
results we obtain are qualitatively the same as those obtained under the upper
bound approximation.
We are now ready to proceed with the analysis of the equilibrium. An equilib-
rium under collaborative consumption exists if there exists (θ, α) ∈ (0, 1)2 that is
a solution to (2.3) and (2.6). When it exists, we denote this solution by (θ∗, α∗).
Knowing the equilibrium allows us to answer important questions regarding prod-
uct ownership, usage, and social welfare, among others.
2.4 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we consider the case where the price is exogenously specified. In
Section 2.5, we treat the case where the price is chosen optimally by the platform.
As mentioned in Section 2.3, the rental price must satisfy do
1−γ ≤ p ≤ 1− dr, since
otherwise, either the owners or renters will not participate. We denote the set of
admissible prices by A = [ do
1−γ , 1 − dr]. For ease of exposition and to allow for
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closed form expressions, we assume that ξ is uniformly distributed in [0, 1] (we
consider more general distributions in Section 2.6.5).
Letting θ denote the solution to pio(ξ) = pir(ξ) leads to
θ =
c− ((1− γ)p− do)α
p+ dr + (1− p− dr)α− ((1− γ)p− do)α. (2.7)
Given θ, the aggregate demand under collaborative consumption is given by
D(θ) = θ
2
2
and the aggregate supply by S(θ) = (1−θ)
2
2
. This leads to ρ(θ) = θ
2
(1−θ)2 ,
and by (2.6)
α =
θ2
(1− θ)2 + θ2 . (2.8)
An equilibrium exists if equations (2.7) and (2.8) admit a solution (θ∗, α∗) in
(0, 1)2.
In the following theorem, we establish the existence and uniqueness of such an
equilibrium. Let Ω = {(p, γ, c, do, dr)|c ∈ (0, 1), γ ∈ [0, 1), (do, dr) ∈ [0, 1]2, p ∈ A}.
Theorem 2.1. A unique equilibrium (θ∗, α∗) exists for each (p, γ, c, do, dr) ∈ Ω.
Moreover, θ∗ and α∗ both (i) strictly increase with the cost of ownership c, com-
mission γ and extra wear and tear cost do, and (ii) strictly decrease with rental
price p and inconvenience cost dr.
Proof. We provide a proof of these results in a more general setting. We assume
the usage distribution has a density function f , and f is continuous with f(ξ) > 0
for ξ ∈ (0, 1). Under these assumptions, (θ∗, α∗) ∈ (0, 1)2 is an equilibrium if it
satisfies (2.7) and (2.6).
Observe that the right hand side of equation (2.6) is strictly increasing in θ,
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and the right hand side of equation (2.7) is decreasing in α, as
∂θ
∂α
=
(c− p− dr)((1− γ)p− do)− c(1− p− dr)
(p+ dr + (1− p− dr)α− ((1− γ)p− do)α)2 ≤ 0.
This inequality holds because, on one hand, (c−p−dr)((1−γ)p−do)−c(1−p−dr) =
(1− p−dr)((1−γ)p−do− c)− (1− c)((1−γ)p−do) ≤ 0 if (1−γ)p−do ≤ c, and
on the other hand, (c− p− dr)((1− γ)p−wo)− c(1− p− dr) = (c− p− dr)((1−
γ)p− do − c)− c(1− c) < 0 if (1− γ)p− do > c. It is easy to show that (by the
Intermediate Value Theorem) there exists a unique solution (θ∗, α∗) ∈ (0, 1)2 to
(2.7) and (2.6) for each (p, γ, c, do, dr) ∈ Ω. Therefore, we denote this equilibrium
by (θ∗(p, γ, c, do, dr), α∗(p, γ, c, do, dr)).
For the rest of the proof, let
h(θ, α, p, γ, c, do, dr)
=(h1(·), h2(·))
=(θ − c− ((1− γ)p− do)α
p+ dr + (1− p− dr)α− ((1− γ)p− do)α, α−
D(θ)
S(θ) +D(θ)
),
and
g(p, γ, c, do, dr) = (g1(·), g2(·)) = (θ∗(·), α∗(·)).
Observe that h is continuous on [0, 1]2×Ω unless (α, p, γ, do, dr) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0) or
(α, p, dr) = (0, 0, 0), and that g(·) is the unique solution to h(g(·), p, γ, c, do, dr) = 0
in (0, 1)2. It is easy to show that (by the subsequence principle) g(·) is continuous
on Ω.
To show g is continuously differentiable on Ω◦ (the interior of Ω), we use Euler’s
notation D for differential operators. For any component x and y of the function
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h, we have
D(x,y)h =
 ∂h1∂x ∂h1∂y
∂h2
∂x
∂h2
∂y
 .
It follows that
D(θ,α)h =
 1 c(1−p−dr)−(c−p−dr)((1−γ)p−do)(p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α)2
− θf(θ)S(θ)+(1−θ)f(θ)D(θ)
(S(θ)+D(θ))2
1

As shown earlier, c(1−p−dr)−(c−p−dr)((1−γ)p−do)
(p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α)2 > 0 on Ω
◦. Therefore, D(θ,α)h is
always invertible. By the Implicit Function Theorem, g is continuously differen-
tiable, and for each component x,
Dxg = −[D(θ,α)h]−1Dxh, (2.9)
where
[D(θ,α)h]
−1 =
1
det(D(θ,α)h)
 1 − c(1−p−dr)−(c−p−dr)((1−γ)p−do)(p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α)2
θf(θ)S(θ)+(1−θ)f(θ)D(θ)
(S(θ)+D(θ))2
1
 .
Calculating Dxh for each component x leads to
Dγh =
 pα(c−p−dr−(1−p−dr)α)(p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α)2
0
 ,Dch =
 − 1p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α
0
 ,
Ddoh =
 α(c−p−dr−(1−p−dr)α)(p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α)2
0
 ,Ddrh =
 (1−α)(c−((1−γ)p−do)α)(p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α)2
0
 ,
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and
Dph =
 (1−γ)α(α−c)+c(1−α)+(1−γ)α(1−α)dr+α(1−α)do(p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α)2
0
 .
It is easy to see that (1−γ)α(α−c)+c(1−α) = ((1−γ)α−c)(α−c)+c(1−c)
is strictly postitive for both α > c and α ≤ c. It is also clear from (2.7) that, in
equilibrium, we have c− ((1− γ)p− do)α > 0 and c− p− dr − (1− p− dr)α < 0.
Therefore, Dph > 0, Dγh < 0, Dch < 0, Ddoh < 0 and Ddrh > 0 in equilibrium.
So, we conclude ∂θ
∗
∂p
< 0, ∂α
∗
∂p
< 0, ∂θ
∗
∂γ
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂γ
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂c
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂c
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂do
> 0,
∂α∗
∂do
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂dr
< 0, and ∂α
∗
∂dr
< 0.
Let ω∗ and q∗ denote the corresponding ownership and total usage in equilib-
rium. Then,
ω∗ = 1− θ∗
and
q∗ =
1− α∗θ∗2
2
,
where the expression for q∗ follows from noting that q∗ =
∫
[θ∗,1] ξ dξ + β
∫
[0,θ∗] ξ dξ
(note that total usage is the sum of usage from the owners and the fraction of
usage from the non-owners that is satisfied through renting).
The following proposition describes how ownership and usage in equilibrium
vary with the problem’s parameters.
Proposition 2.2. In equilibrium, ownership ω∗ and usage q∗ both strictly increase
in price p and inconvenience cost dr, and strictly decrease in cost of ownership c,
commission γ and extra wear and tear cost do.
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Proof. It follows from Theorem 2.1 and the fact that both ω∗ = 1 − θ∗ and
q∗ = 1−α
∗θ∗2
2
are decreasing in θ∗ and α∗.
While the monotonicity results in Proposition 2.2 are perhaps expected, it is
not clear how ownership and usage under collaborative consumption compare to
those under no collaborative consumption. In the following subsection, we provide
comparisons between systems with and without collaborative consumption, and
address the questions of whether or not collaborative consumption reduces product
ownership and usage.
2.4.1 Impact of Collaborative Consumption on Ownership
and Usage
In the absence of collaborative consumption, an individual would own a product
if u(ξ) ≥ c and would not otherwise. Let θˆ denote the solution to u(ξ) = c. Then,
the fraction of the population that corresponds to owners (ownership) is given by
ωˆ =
∫
[θˆ,1]
f(ξ) dξ = 1− c,
with an associated usage given by
qˆ =
∫
[θˆ,1]
ξf(ξ) dξ =
1− c2
2
.
In the following proposition, we compare ownership level with and without
collaborative consumption. Without loss of generality, we assume here (and in
the rest of the paper) that do
1−γ < 1 − dr so that the set of admissible prices
consists of more than a single price.
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Proposition 2.3. There exists pω ∈ ( do1−γ , 1 − dr) such that ω∗ = ωˆ if p = pω,
ω∗ < ωˆ if p < pω, and ω∗ > ωˆ otherwise. Moreover,
∂pω
∂γ
> 0, ∂pω
∂c
< 0, ∂pω
∂do
> 0,
and ∂pω
∂dr
< 0.
Proof. By Equations (2.7) and (2.8), θ∗ is the unique solution to
φ(θ, p) = [(1 + p+ dr)− ((1− γ)p− do)]θ3 − [2(p+ dr + c)− ((1− γ)p− do)]θ2 + (p+ dr + 2c)θ − c = 0
(2.10)
in (0, 1). Replacing θ by c in (2.10) leads to φ(c, p) = c(1 − c)[(1 − γc)p − ((1 −
dr)(1 − c) + doc)] = 0. This implies pω = (1−dr)(1−c)+doc1−γc is the rental price that
induces θ∗ = c, or equivalently, ω∗ = ωˆ. As we assume do
1−γ < 1 − dr, it is easy
to verify that pω ∈ ( do1−γ , 1− dr). This implies that it is always possible to induce
ω∗ = ωˆ. As ω∗ is strictly increasing in p, the first statement follows. In addition,
we have ∂pω
∂γ
= c((1−dr)(1−c)+doc)
(1−γc)2 > 0,
∂pω
∂c
= do−(1−γ)(1−dr)
(1−γc)2 < 0,
∂pω
∂do
= c
1−γc > 0, and
∂pω
∂dr
= c−1
1−γc < 0.
Proposition 2.3 shows that depending on the rental price p, collaborative con-
sumption can result in either lower or higher ownership. In particular, when the
rental price p is sufficiently high (above the threshold pω), collaborative consump-
tion leads to higher ownership (e.g., more cars). Moreover, the threshold pω is
decreasing in the cost of ownership c and renter’s inconvenience dr, and increasing
in the commission rate γ and extra wear and tear cost do. The fact that pω is
decreasing in c is perhaps surprising as it shows that collaborative consumption
is more likely to lead to more ownership (and not less) when the cost of owning
is high. This can be explained as follows. In the absence of collaborative con-
sumption, when the cost of ownership is high, there are mostly non-owners. With
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the introduction of collaborative consumption, owning becomes more affordable
as rental income subsidizes the high cost of ownership. In that case, even at low
rental prices, there are individuals (those with high usage) who would switch to
being owners. This switch is made more attractive by the high probability of
finding a renter (given the high fraction of renters in the population). On the
other hand,when the cost of ownership is low, only individuals with low usage are
non-owners. For collaborative consumption to turn these non-owners into owners
and lead to higher ownership, the rental price needs to be high. This is also needed
to compensate for the low probability of finding a renter.
Similarly, usage can be either lower or higher with collaborative consumption
than without it. In this case, there is again a price threshold pq above which usage
is higher with collaborative consumption, and below which usage is higher without
collaborative consumption. When either do or dr is sufficiently high, collaborative
consumption always leads to higher usage. The result is stated in Proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.4. There exists t ∈ (0, 1) such that (i) if do
1−γ + dr < t, then there
exists pq ∈ ( do1−γ , 1− dr) such that q∗ = qˆ if p = pq, q∗ < qˆ if p < pq, and q∗ > qˆ if
p > pq; (ii) otherwise, q
∗ ≥ qˆ for all p ∈ [ do
1−γ , 1− dr].
Proof. From Proposition 2.3, we have q∗(pω) = 1−α
∗c2
2
> 1−c
2
2
= qˆ. As q∗ is
continuously increasing in p, we know that either (i) or (ii) is true. Moreover, if
we let p = do
1−γ be the minimal admissible price. Then, (i) is true if and only if
q∗(p) < qˆ; Otherwise, (ii) is true. In the rest of the proof, we show that there
exists some t ∈ (0, 1) such that (i) q∗(p) < qˆ if do
1−γ + dr < t, and (ii) q
∗(p) ≥ qˆ if
do
1−γ + dr ≥ t.
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To this end, we first show that q∗(p) is strictly increasing in do
1−γ + dr. As
q∗ strictly decreases in θ∗, it suffices to show that θ∗(p) is strictly decreasing in
do
1−γ + dr. From (2.10), we have
φ(θ, p) = θ3 − 2cθ2 + 2cθ − c+ ( do
1− γ + dr)(θ
3 − 2θ2 + θ).
It is clear that φ(θ, p) is strictly increasing in do
1−γ + dr for θ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,
θ∗(p), the unique solution to φ(θ, p) = 0, must be strictly decreasing in do
1−γ + dr.
We next show that q∗(p) > qˆ if do
1−γ+dr = 1 (this corresponds to when
do
1−γ+dr is
at its largest), and q∗(p) < qˆ if do
1−γ +dr = 0 (this corresponds to when
do
1−γ +dr is at
its smallest). Substituting α∗ by θ∗ yields q∗(p) = 1
2
− θ∗4
2(2θ∗2−2θ∗+1) . It follows that
q∗(p) < qˆ if and only if ψ(p) = θ∗4−2c2θ∗2+2c2θ∗−c2 > 0. Note that φ(θ∗(p), p) =
0. Therefore, ψ(p) = ψ(p)−cφ(θ∗(p), p) = θ∗4−cθ∗3−c( do
1−γ +dr)(θ
∗3−2θ∗2 +θ∗).
Then, if do
1−γ +dr = 1, we have ψ(p) = θ
∗(θ∗3−2cθ∗2+2cθ∗−c) < θ∗φ(θ∗(p), p) = 0.
On the other hand, if do
1−γ + dr = 0, we have ψ(p) = θ
∗4 − cθ∗3 > 0, since, by
Proposition 2.3, θ∗(p) > c.
Finally, as q∗(p) is strictly increasing in do
1−γ + dr, by the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there exists t ∈ (0, 1) such that q∗(p) < qˆ if do
1−γ + dr < t and q
∗(p) ≥ qˆ
if do
1−γ + dr ≥ t. This completes the proof.
Unlike pω, the price threshold pq is not monotonic in c (see Figure 2.1). As
c increases, pq first increases then decreases. To understand the reason, note
that collaborative consumption can lead to higher usage due to the new usage
from non-owners. On the other hand, it can lead to lower usage if ownership
decreases sufficiently (certainly to a level lower than that without collaborative
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consumption) such that the decrease in usage from those who switch from owning
to renting is larger than the increase in usage from those who are non-owners. This
implies that lower usage is less likely to happen if either (i) the individuals who
switch from owning to renting can fulfill most of their usage via renting, or (ii)
the usage from non-owners is high. The first scenario is true when the population
of owners is high (i.e., the cost of ownership is low), whereas the second scenario
is true when the population of non-owners is high (i.e., cost of ownership is high).
Therefore, collaborative consumption is less likely to lead to lower usage when the
cost of ownership is either very low or very high. Hence, the threshold pq is first
increasing then decreasing in c. When the cost of ownership is moderate, there is
a balance of owners and non-owners without collaborative consumption, allowing
for ownership to sufficiently decrease with relatively moderate rental prices, which
in turn leads to lower usage and, correspondingly, a relatively higher threshold pq.
The following corollary to Propositions 3 and 4 summarizes the joint impact
of p and c on ownership and usage.
Corollary 2.5. In settings where pω and pq are well defined (per Propositions
3 and 4), collaborative consumption leads to higher ownership and higher usage
when p > pω, lower ownership but higher usage when pq < p ≤ pω, and lower
ownership and lower usage when p ≤ pq.
Corollary 2.5, along with Propositions 3 and 4, show how price thresholds pω
and pq segment the full range of values of c and p into three regions, in which
collaborative consumption leads to (i) lower ownership and lower usage, (ii) lower
ownership but higher usage, and (iii) higher ownership and higher usage. Thes
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three regions are illustrated in Figure 2.1. These results highlight the fact that
the impact of collaborative consumption on ownership and usage is perhaps more
nuanced than what is sometimes claimed by advocates of collaborative consump-
tion. The results could have implications for public policy. For example, in regions
where the cost of ownership is high, the results imply that, unless rental prices
are kept sufficiently low or the commission extracted by the platform is made suf-
ficiently high, collaborative consumption would lead to more ownership and more
usage. This could be an undesirable outcome if there are negative externalities
associated with ownership and usage. Higher usage also implies less usage of the
outside option (e.g., less use of public transport).
(a) γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0
Figure 2.1: Ownership and usage for varying rental prices and ownership costs
2.4.2 Impact of Collaborative Consumption on Consumers
Next, we examine the impact of collaborative consumption on consumer payoff.
Consumer payoff is of course always higher with the introduction of collaborative
consumption (consumers retain the option of either owning or not owning, but
now enjoy the additional benefit of earning rental income if they decide to own, or
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of fulfilling some of their usage through renting if they decide not to own). What
is less clear is who, among consumers with different usage levels, benefit more
from collaborative consumption.
Proposition 2.6. Let pi∗(ξ) and pˆi(ξ) denote respectively the consumer payoff with
and without collaborative consumption. Then, the difference in consumer payoff
pi∗(ξ)− pˆi(ξ) is positive, piecewise linear, strictly increasing on [0, c), and strictly
decreasing on [c, 1].
Proof. We have
pi∗(ξ)− pˆi(ξ) =

(1− α∗)ξ(1− p− dr) for 0 ≤ ξ < c;
−α∗ξ − (1− α∗)ξ(p+ dr) + c for c ≤ ξ < θ∗;
(1− ξ)α∗[(1− γ)p− do] for θ∗ ≤ ξ ≤ 1,
if θ∗ ≥ c, and
pi∗(ξ)− pˆi(ξ) =

(1− α∗)ξ(1− p− dr) for 0 ≤ ξ < θ∗;
ξ + (1− ξ)α∗[(1− γ)p− do]− c for θ∗ ≤ ξ < c;
(1− ξ)α∗[(1− γ)p− do] for c ≤ ξ ≤ 1,
if θ∗ < c. As individuals retain the option of not paticipating, it is clear that
pi∗(ξ)− pˆi(ξ) is positive. It is also easy to see that pi∗(ξ)− pˆi(ξ) is piecewise linear,
increasing on [0, c), and decreasing on [c, 1].
An important implication from Proposition 2.6 (from the fact that the differ-
ence in consumer surplus pi∗(ξ) − pˆi(ξ) is strictly increasing on [0, c) and strictly
decreasing on [c, 1]) is that consumers who benefit the most from collaborative
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consumption are those who are indifferent between owning and not owning with-
out collaborative consumption (recall that [c, 1] corresponds to the population of
owners in the absence of collaborative consumption). This can be explained by
noting that there are always three segments of consumers (see Figure 2.2). In the
case where θ∗ ≥ c (Figure 2.2 (a)), which corresponds to the case where owner-
ship decreases with collaborative consumption, the first segment corresponds to
consumers who are non-owners in the absence of collaborative consumption and
continue to be non-owners with collaborative consumption (indicated by “non-
owners→non-owners” in Figure 2.2). The benefit these consumers derive from
collaborative consumption is due to fulfilling part of their usage through access-
ing a rented product. This benefit is increasing in their usage.
(a) θ∗ > c, p = 0.5, γ = 0.2, c = 0.27, do = dr =
0
(b) θ∗ < c, p = 0.95, γ = 0.2, c = 0.75, do =
dr = 0
Figure 2.2: Impact of usage level on the difference in consumer payoff
The second segment corresponds to consumers who are owners in the absence
of collaborative consumption and switch to being non-owners with collaborative
consumption (indicated by “owners→non-owners”). These consumers have to
give up the fulfillment of some usage (because a rental product may not always
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be available) and the amount they give up is increasing in their usage. Therefore,
the amount of benefit they receive from renting decreases in their usage level. The
third segment consists of consumers who are owners in the absence of collaborative
consumption and continue to be owners with collaborative consumption (indicated
by “owners→owners”). The benefit they experience is due to rental income. This
income is decreasing in their usage (they have less capacity to rent when they have
more usage). A similar explanation can be provided for the case where θ∗ < c
(Figure 2.2 (b)).
2.5 The Platform’s Problem
In this section, we consider the problem faced by the platform. We first con-
sider the case of a for-profit platform whose objective is to maximize the revenue
from successful transactions. Then, we consider the case of a not-for-profit plat-
form (e.g., a platform owned by a non-profit organization, government agency,
or municipality) whose objective is to maximize social welfare.6 We compare the
outcomes of these platforms in terms of ownership, usage and social welfare. We
also benchmark the social welfare of these platforms against the maximum feasible
social welfare.
A platform may decide, among others, on the price and commission rate. In
this section, we focus on price as the primary decision made by the platform and
6An example of a not-for-profit platform is NeighborGoods, a peer-to-peer platform that facil-
itates the sharing of household goods. NeighborGoods allows owners to earn a rental fee but
does not extract for itself a commission rate.
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treat other parameters as being exogenously specified (a survey of major peer-
to-peer car sharing platforms worldwide reveals that commission rates fall mostly
within a relatively narrow range, from 30% to 40% for those that include insurance,
and do not typically vary across markets in which platforms operate). There are
of course settings where the price is a decision made by the owners. Price may
then be determined through a market clearing mechanism (i.e., the price under
which supply equals demand; see for example Jiang and Tian [2016]). In our case,
because of friction in matching supply and demand, the supply-demand balance
equation in (2.4) can, per Theorem 1, be satisfied by any feasible price. Thus,
the market clearing price is not unique and the system may settle on a price that
maximizes neither social welfare nor platform revenue. Moreover, as we show in
Section 5.1, platform revenue (or social welfare) can be highly sensitive to price,
giving the platform an incentive to optimize price. Platform pricing may also be
beneficial to owners as it can serve as a coordinating tool and reduce competition
among them. More significantly, and as we show in Section 2.5.2, the social welfare
that results from a for-profit platform tends to be close to that resulting from a
not-for-profit platform.
In what follows, we provide detailed analysis for the for-profit and not-for-
profit platforms under the assumptions of Section 2.4. In Sections 2.5.1 to 2.5.3,
we consider the case where (do, dr) = (0, 0). In Section 2.5.4, we discuss the case
where (do, dr) 6= (0, 0).
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2.5.1 The For-Profit Platform
For a for-profit platform, the objective is to maximize γpαS(θ) the commission
income generated from the fraction of supply that is matched with demand. In
particular, the platforms optimization problem can be stated as follows.
max
p
vr(p) = γpαS(θ) (2.11)
subject to pio(θ) = pir(θ), (2.12)
α =
D(θ)
D(θ) + S(θ)
, (2.13)
p ≥ do
1− γ , and (2.14)
p ≤ 1− dr. (2.15)
The constraints (2.12) and (2.13) are the defining equations for the equilibrium
(θ∗, α∗). Constraints (2.14) and (2.15) ensure that price is in the feasible set A.
In what follows, we assume that γ > 0 (the platform’s revenue is otherwise always
zero).
Under the assumptions of Section 2.4, the for-profit platform’s problem can
be restated as follows:
maxp vr(p) =
1
2
γpα(1− θ)2 (2.16)
subject to (2.7) and (2.8) and p ∈ A. It is difficult to analyze (2.16) directly.
However, as the map between θ and p is bijective, we can use (2.7) and (2.8) to
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express p in terms of θ as
p(θ) =
−θ3 + 2cθ2 − 2cθ + c
θ(θ − 1)(γθ − 1) . (2.17)
Hence, (2.16) can be expressed as
maxθ vr(θ) =
γ
2
(1−θ)θ(θ3−2cθ2+2cθ−c)
((1−θ)2+θ2)(γθ−1) subject to θ ∈ [θ, θ] (2.18)
where θ is the solution to (2.7) and (2.8) at p = 1, θ is the solution at p = 0,
and [θ, θ] is the set of solutions induced by p ∈ [0, 1]. We can use (2.17) to verify
whether θ is in [θ, θ]. Specifically, θ < θ if p(θ) > 1, θ ∈ [θ, θ] if p(θ) ∈ [0, 1], and
θ > θ if p(θ) < 0.
Proposition 2.7. vr(θ) is strictly quasiconcave in θ.
Proposition 2.7 shows that the platform’s problem is not difficult to solve. De-
pending on the value of γ and c, vr(θ) is either decreasing or first increasing then
decreasing on [θ, θ]. In both cases, the optimal solution to (2.18), which we de-
note by θ∗r , is unique; see Appendix 2.B for a proof of this and all subsequent
results. We let p∗r, ω
∗
r , and q
∗
r denote the corresponding price, ownership, and
usage, respectively. We also use the notation v∗r to denote the optimal revenue
vr(θ
∗
r).
Proposition 2.8. The platform’s optimal revenue, v∗r , is strictly quasiconcave in
c, first strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing.
Proposition 2.8 suggests that a platform would be most profitable when the cost
of ownership is “moderate” and away from the extremes of being either very high
or very low. In these extreme cases, not enough transactions take place because
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of either not enough renters (when the cost of ownership is low) or not enough
owners (when the cost of ownership is high). This is perhaps consistent with
the experience of iCarsclub, a peer-to-peer car sharing platform, that was first
launched in Singapore, a country where the cost of ownership is exceptionally high
and car ownership is low. iCarsclub struggled in Singapore and had to temporarily
suspend operations. However, it is thriving in China where it operates under the
name PPzuche and is present in several cities (Clifford Teo, CEO of iCarsclub,
personal communication, 2015). This result also implies that a platform may
have an incentive to affect the cost of ownership. For example, when the cost of
ownership is low, a platform may find it beneficial to impose a fixed membership
fee on owners, increasing the effective cost of ownership. On the other hand,
when the cost of ownership is high, the platform may find it beneficial to lower
the effective cost of ownership by offering, for example, subsidies (or assistance
with financing) toward the purchase of new products.
Proposition 2.9. There exists a threshold cr,ω ∈ (0, 1) such that optimal owner-
ship ω∗r = ωˆ if c = cr,ω, ω
∗
r < ωˆ if c < cr,ω, and ω
∗
r > ωˆ otherwise, with cr,ω strictly
increasing in γ.
Proposition 2.9 shows that it continues to be possible, even when the price is cho-
sen optimally by a revenue maximizing platform, for collaborative consumption to
lead to either higher or lower ownership. In particular, collaborative consumption
leads to higher ownership when the cost of ownership is sufficiently high (above
the threshold cr,ω) and to lower ownership when the cost of ownership is suffi-
ciently low (below the threshold cr,ω). This can be explained as follows. The
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platform has an incentive to somewhat balance supply and demand (otherwise
few rentals will take place). When the cost of ownership is high, ownership is
low in the absence of collaborative consumption. In this case, the platform would
try to induce, via higher prices, higher ownership, so as to generate more supply
(hence, the result that a sufficiently high cost of ownership leads to higher owner-
ship under collaborative consumption).7 Similarly, when the cost of ownership is
low, the platform would try to induce lower ownership via lower prices, so as to
generate more demand (hence, the result that a sufficiently low cost of ownership
leads to low ownership under collaborative consumption).
We also observe that usage under platform pricing can be either higher or lower
than that without collaborative consumption. Again, there exists a threshold
cr,q < cr,ω in the cost of ownership, below which collaborative consumption leads
to lower usage and above which collaborative consumption leads to higher usage.
The impact of ownership cost on product ownership and usage under platform
pricing is illustrated in Figure 2.3 where the dashed black line corresponds to the
optimal price.
2.5.2 The Not-for-Profit Platform
For a not-for-profit platform, the objective is to maximize social welfare (i.e., the
sum of consumer surplus and platform revenue). Thus, the platform’s problem
7This perhaps validates concerns expressed by the Singapore authorities that allowing peer-
to-peer car sharing would increase car usage and road congestion and their initial decision to
restrict peer-to-peer car rentals to evenings and weekends (Clifford Teo, CEO of iCarsclub,
personal communication, 2015).
43
(a) γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0
Figure 2.3: Impact of ownership cost on ownership and usage
can be stated as
max
p
vs(p) =
∫
[θ,1]
(ξ − c)f(ξ) dξ +
∫
[0,θ)
βξf(ξ) dξ, (2.19)
subject to constraints (2.12)-(2.15).
Under the assumptions of Section 2.4, the platform’s problem can be restated
as follows:
maxp vs(p) =
1
2
(1− αθ2)− (1− θ)c (2.20)
subject to (2.7) and (2.8) and p ∈ A, or equivalently as
maxθ vs(θ) =
1
2
(1− θ4
(1−θ)2+θ2 )− (1− θ)c subject to θ ∈ [θ, θ]. (2.21)
Analysis and results similar to those obtained for the for-profit platform can
be obtained for the not-for-profit platform. In particular, we can show that the
social welfare function, vs, is strictly concave in θ, indicating that computing the
optimal solution for the not-for-profit platform is also not difficult (we omit the
details for the sake of brevity). The result also implies that (2.21) admits a unique
optimal solution, which we denote by θ∗s , with a resulting optimal social welfare
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which we denote by v∗s .
The following proposition characterizes θ∗s for varying values of γ.
Proposition 2.10. There exists a strictly positive decreasing function γs(c) such
that θ∗s ∈ (θ, θ) if γ < γs, and θ∗s = θ otherwise. Consequently, if γ ≤ γs(c), then
max
θ∈[θ,θ]
vs = max
θ∈[0,1]
vs.
Proposition 2.10 shows that θ∗s is an interior solution (satisfying
∂vs
∂θ
(θ∗s) = 0) if
the commission rate is sufficiently low (below the threshold γs). Otherwise, it
is the boundary solution θ. In particular, θ∗s could never take the value of θ.
An important implication of this result is that, when γ < γs, a not-for-profit
platform that relies on price alone as a decision variable would be able to achieve
the maximum feasible social welfare (i.e., the social welfare that would be realized
by a social planner who can directly decide on the fraction of non-owners, θ).
Note that this is especially true if the not-for-profit platform does not charge a
commission rate (i.e., γ = 0).
Similar to the case of the for-profit platform, we can also show that a not-for-
profit platform can lead to either higher or lower ownership or usage (relative to the
case without collaborative consumption). Again, there are thresholds cs,q < cs,ω in
the cost of ownership such that (i) ownership and usage are both lower if c ≤ cs,q,
(ii) ownership is lower but usage is higher if cs,q < c ≤ cs,ω, and (iii) ownership
and usage are both higher if c ≥ cs,ω. The impact of ownership cost on product
ownership and usage under platform pricing is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
In the following proposition, we compare outcomes under the for-profit and
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(a) γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0
Figure 2.4: Impact of ownership cost on ownership and usage
not-for-profit platforms. In particular, we show that a not-for-profit platform
would always charge a lower price than a for-profit platform. Therefore, it would
also induce lower ownership and lower usage.
Proposition 2.11. Let p∗s, ω
∗
s and q
∗
s denote the optimal price, ownership and
usage levels under a not-for-profit platform, respectively. Then, p∗s ≤ p∗r, ω∗s ≤ ω∗r ,
and q∗s ≤ q∗r .
A not-for-profit platform induces lower ownership by charging lower prices because
it accounts for the negative impact of the cost of ownership on social welfare. In
settings where there are negative externalities associated with ownership and us-
age, the result in Proposition 2.11 shows that, even without explicitly accounting
for these costs, the not-for-profit platform would also lower such externalities
(since both ownership and usage are lower). The fact that social welfare is max-
imized at prices lower than those that would be charged by a for-profit platform
suggests that a regulator may be able to nudge a for-profit platform toward out-
comes with higher social welfare by putting a cap on price.
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Figure 2.5 illustrates the differences in social welfare between a system with-
out collaborative consumption and systems with collaborative consumption under
(a) a for-profit platform (a revenue-maximizing platform) and (b) a not-for-profit
platform (a social welfare-maximizing platform). Systems with collaborative con-
sumption can improve social welfare substantially, especially when the cost of
ownership is neither too high nor too low (in those extreme cases, there are either
mostly owners or mostly renters and, therefore, few transactions). However, the
differences in social welfare between the for-profit and not-for-profit platforms are
not very significant. This is because both platforms have a similar interest in
maintaining a relative balance of renters and owners.
(a) γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0
Figure 2.5: Impact of ownership cost on social welfare
2.5.3 Systems with Negative Externalities
In this section, we consider settings where there are negative externalities associ-
ated with either usage or ownership. In that case, social welfare must account for
the additional cost of these externalities. In particular, the following additional
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terms must be subtracted from the expression of social welfare in (2.19)
eqq(θ) + eωω(θ), (2.22)
or equivalently
eq
(∫
[θ,1]
ξf(ξ) dξ + β
∫
[0,θ)
ξf(ξ) dξ
)
+ eω
∫
[θ,1]
f(ξ) dξ, (2.23)
where eq and eω correspond to the social (or environmental) cost per unit of usage
and per unit of ownership, respectively. This is consistent with the so-called
lifecycle approach to assessing the social impact of using and owning products
(see for example Reap et al. [2008]). The parameter eq accounts for the social
(or environmental) cost of using a product not captured by the utility (e.g., the
cost of pollution associated with using a product), while eω would account for the
social cost of product manufacturing, distribution, and end-of-life disposal.
For a not-for-profit platform, the optimization problem can then be restated
as
maxθ ve(θ) =
1
2
(1− eq)(1− θ4(1−θ)2+θ2 )− (c+ eω)(1− θ) subject to θ ∈ [θ, θ].
(2.24)
It is easy to show that the modified social welfare function ve is still strictly
quasiconcave in θ. Moreover, the optimal solution, which we denote by θ∗e , is
strictly increasing in both eq and eω. As a result, the ownership and usage levels
obtained under eq > 0 and eω > 0 are lower than those obtained under eq = eω = 0.
Therefore, Proposition 2.11 continues to hold. However, Proposition 2.10 may no
longer be valid if either eq or eω is too large. That is, the platform may not
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be able to achieve the maximum feasible social welfare even if the commission
rate is negligible. In this case, in order to achieve a higher social welfare, the
platform may need to either subsidize non-owners (e.g., improve rental experience
by reducing inconvenience cost) or penalize owners (e.g., make the ownership cost
higher by charging extra tax on ownership), in addition to setting a low rental
price.
We conclude this section by addressing the question of whether collaborative
consumption reduces the total cost of negative externalities, eqq(θ) + eωω(θ). Re-
call that collaborative consumption (under either a for-profit or a not-for-profit
platform) leads to lower ownership and lower usage when the cost of ownership
is sufficiently low, and it leads to higher ownership and higher usage when the
cost of ownership is sufficiently high (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). This implies that
collaborative consumption could either decrease or increase negative externalities,
with a decrease more likely when the cost of ownership is low. In numerical experi-
ments, we observe that there exists a threshold on the cost of ownership, which we
denote by ce, such that collaborative consumption reduces negative externalities
if and only if c < ce. We also observe that ce is decreasing in eq and increasing
in eω, indicating that collaborative consumption is more likely to reduce negative
externalities if the social (or environmental) cost of using products is relatively
low compared to that of owning. This is illustrated for an example system in
Figure 2.6.
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(a) γ = 0.2, eq = eω = 1 (b) γ = 0.2, eq = 1
Figure 2.6: The impact of collaborative consumption on negative externalities
2.5.4 The Impact of Extra Wear and Tear and Inconve-
nience Costs
In this section, we consider the case where (do, dr) 6= 0. The extra wear and
tear cost do reduces the payoff of owners and, therefore, places a lower bound
on the set of admissible prices: p ≥ do
(1−γ) . Similarly, the inconvenience cost dr
reduces the payoff of renters and, consequently, places an upper bound on the
price: p ≤ 1 − dr. Obtaining analytical results is difficult. However, we are able
to confirm numerically that all the results obtained for (do, dr) = 0 continue to
hold (details are omitted for brevity).
Of additional interest is the impact of do and dr on platform revenue and social
welfare. For both the for-profit and not-for-profit platforms, we observe that social
welfare is decreasing in both do and dr. This is consistent with intuition. However,
revenue for the for-profit platform can be non-monotonic in do. In particular, when
the cost of ownership is low, platform revenue can first increase then decrease with
do. This effect appears related to the fact that platform revenue is, per Proposition
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8, non-monotonic in the cost of ownership. A higher value of do can be beneficial
to the platform if it helps balance the amount of owners and renters (i.e., reduce
ownership), leading to a greater amount of transactions. An implication from this
result is that between two platforms, the one with the higher wear and tear cost
(everything else being equal) can be more profitable. The result also implies that
a for-profit platform may not always have an incentive to reduce this cost. Note
that, in some cases, a platform could exert costly effort to reduce this cost. For
example, when extra wear and tear is, in part, due to renters’ negligence, more
effort could be invested in the vetting of would-be renters. Alternatively, the
platform could provide more comprehensive insurance coverage or monitor more
closely the usage behavior of a renter (such monitoring technology is already
available for example in the case of cars). On the other hand, the inconvenience
cost dr does not have the same effect on platform revenue. An increase in dr could
lead to more transactions. However, it limits the price a platform could charge.
The net effect is that the platform revenue is always decreasing in dr. These effects
are illustrated in Figure 2.7.
2.6 Extensions
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results by extending the analysis
to two important settings: (1) a setting where non-owners, in addition to renting
from individual owners, have the option of renting from a third party service
provider and (2) a setting where the platform, in addition to matching owners
and non-owners, can also own products that it puts out for rent. In each case, we
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(a) γ = 0.4, c = 0.2, dr = 0 (b) γ = 0.4, c = 0.8, do = 0
Figure 2.7: Platform revenue for varying extra wear and tear and inconvenience
costs
examine, how collaborative consumption affects ownership and usage, and how
these outcomes vary from those observed in the original model. We also discuss
other extensions and generalizations. In particular, we consider cases where (1) the
extra wear and tear and inconvenience costs are heterogeneous among individuals
and (2) usage, instead of being exogenously specified, is a decision individuals
make, and (3) usage is exogenous but has a general distribution.
2.6.1 Systems with a Third Party Service Provider
In this section, we consider a setting where the outside option for non-owners
includes renting through a third party service provider. The service provider
(e.g., a car rental service) owns multiple units of the product which they make
available for rent. We let p˜ denote the rental price and d˜r the inconvenience cost
incurred by a renter when using the service (we use “~” throughout to indicate
the parameters for the third party service provider). We allow for the possibility
that the service is not always reliable, and we denote the fraction of time that a
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product is available for rent from the service provider when requested by a renter
by β˜. We refer to β˜ as the service level of the service provider. As in the original
model, we focus on the case where the utility function u(ξ) = ξ, and individual
usage ξ follows a uniform distribution
In the case of no collaborative consumption (i.e., peer-to-peer product sharing
is not available), individuals have the option of either owning the product or
renting it through the service provider. An owner with usage level ξ has payoff
p˜io(ξ) = ξ − c
while a renter has payoff
p˜ir(ξ) = β˜(1− p˜− d˜r)ξ.
Let
θ˜ =

c
p˜+d˜r+(1−p˜−d˜r)(1−β˜) if β˜ ≤
1−c
1−p˜−d˜r
1 otherwise.
Then, individuals with usage ξ < θ˜ choose to be renters, those with usage ξ > θ˜
choose to be owners, and those with usage ξ = θ˜ are indifferent between renting
and owning. Note that when the service level is sufficiently high (β˜ ≥ 1−c
1−p˜−d˜),
there are no owners and everyone chooses to rent. The threshold above which the
service level must be for this to occur is decreasing in the cost of ownership and
increasing in the rental price and inconvenience cost.
In the presence of collaborative consumption, we assume that consumers al-
ways prefer peer-to-peer product sharing over renting through the service provider.8
8It is possible to treat the reverse case. It is also possible to consider alternative assumptions,
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That is, we require p + dr ≤ p˜ + d˜r. A consumer would then seek to rent from
the service provider when no product is available through peer-to-peer product
sharing. An owner with usage ξ has payoff
pio(ξ) = ξ + (1− ξ)α((1− γ)p− do)− c
while that of a renter is given by
pir(ξ) = β(1− p− dr)ξ − (1− β)β˜(1− p˜− d˜r)ξ.
An equilibrium under collaborative consumption can be defined in a similar way
as in Section 2.3. In particular, θ is now given by
θ = min
(
max
(
0,
c− ((1− γ)p− do)α
(p+ dr) + [(1− p− dr)− β˜(1− p˜− d˜r)− ((1− γ)p− do)]α
)
, 1
)
(2.25)
while α is again given by
α =
θ2
(1− θ)2 + θ2 . (2.26)
An equilibrium under collaborative consumption exists if (2.25) and (2.26) admit
a solution (θ∗, α∗) ∈ (0, 1)2.
In the following theorem, we show that an equilibrium (θ∗, α∗) under collabo-
rative consumption exists and is unique for each feasible combination of problem
parameters if and only if β˜ < 1−c
1−p˜−d˜r . Let Ω = {(p, γ, c, do, dr, β˜, p˜, d˜r)|c, β˜ ∈
(0, 1), γ ∈ [0, 1), do, dr, p˜, d˜r ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ p˜+ d˜r ≤ 1, do1−γ ≤ p ≤ p˜+ d˜r − dr}.
Theorem 2.12. An equilibrium (θ∗, α∗) under collaborative consumption exists
including the case where price and service level are endogenously determined through the dy-
namics of competition between the sharing platform and the service provider (we leave this as
an area of future investigation).
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and is unique for each (p, γ, c, do, dr, β˜, p˜, d˜r) ∈ Ω if and only if β˜ < 1−c1−p˜−d˜r . In
equilibrium, ∂θ
∗
∂p
< 0, ∂α
∗
∂p
< 0, ∂θ
∗
∂γ
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂γ
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂c
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂c
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂do
> 0,
∂α∗
∂do
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂dr
< 0, ∂α
∗
∂dr
< 0, ∂θ
∗
∂β˜
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂β˜
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂p˜
< 0, ∂α
∗
∂p˜
< 0, ∂θ
∗
∂d˜r
< 0, and
∂α∗
∂d˜r
< 0. Consequently, ownership ω∗ and usage q∗ are both strictly decreasing
in the cost of ownership c, commission γ, and extra wear and tear cost do, but
strictly increasing in rental prices p and p˜, and inconvenience costs dr and d˜r.
Theorem 2.12 suggests that peer-to-peer product sharing can co-exist in equi-
librium with a third party service provider as long as the service level offered by
the service provider is sufficiently low (β˜ < 1−c
1−p˜−d˜). Otherwise, all individuals
would prefer renting through the service provider to owning. As with the original
model in Section 2.4, we can show that ownership ω∗ and usage q∗ still increase
in p, dr (also in p˜ and d˜r), but decrease in c, γ, and do. More importantly, collab-
orative consumption can still lead to either higher or lower ownership and usage.
There are again price thresholds pω and pq that segment the range of values of
c and p into three regions in which collaborative consumption leads to (i) lower
ownership and lower usage, (ii) lower ownership but higher usage, and (iii) higher
ownership and higher usage. The price threshold pω is again decreasing in the cost
of ownership c, implying that higher ownership is more likely when the cost of
ownership is higher. Hence, all the insights, regarding the impact of collaborative
consumption on ownership and usage, continue to be valid. In the case where
the platform chooses prices (either to maximize profit or social welfare), there
are again thresholds cq < cω in the cost of ownership such that (i) ownership
and usage are both lower if c ≤ cq, (ii) ownership is lower but usage is higher if
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cq < c ≤ cω, and (iii) ownership and usage are both higher if c ≥ cω. This is
illustrated for an example system in Figure 2.8.
(a) γ = 0.2, p˜ = 0.9, β˜ = 0.7, do, dr, d˜r = 0
Figure 2.8: Ownership and usage for varying rental prices and ownership costs
In addition to confirming results consistent with the original model, we can
show that the price thresholds pω and pq are both decreasing in the service level
β˜. This is perhaps surprising as it implies that collaborative consumption is more
likely to lead to higher ownership and usage when the service level offered by the
service provider is higher. This can be explained as follows. In the absence of col-
laborative consumption, a higher service level leads to more renters. Introducing
collaborative consumption to a population with a large number of renters makes
ownership attractive as the likelihood of finding a renter would be high. This is
illustrated for an example system in Figure 2.9. Finally, note that the fact that pω
and pq are decreasing in the service level β˜ implies that these thresholds are lower
with a third party service provider than without one (a system with no service
provider can be viewed as one with β˜ = 0).
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(a) γ = 0.2, p˜ = 0.9, c = 0.3, do, dr, d˜r = 0
Figure 2.9: The impact of price and service level on ownership and usage
2.6.2 Systems Where the Platform Owns Assets
We have so far assumed that the platform does not own products of its own and
its only source of revenue is from commissions. This is consistent with the ob-
served practice of most existing peer-to-peer product sharing platforms. Owning
physical assets poses several challenges, particularly to startups, including access
to capital, managerial knowhow, and the need to invest in physical infrastructure
(e.g., parking lots and maintenance facilities in the case of cars). Owning, manag-
ing, and maintaining physical assets can also limit the ability of some platforms
to grow rapidly. More significantly, there can be perceived business risks associ-
ated with the ownership of physical assets. Nevertheless, it is conceivable that,
as these platforms grow, they can find it profitable to own products of their own.
Below, we briefly describe such a setting and examine the implication of product
ownership by the platform.
Consider a setting similar in all aspects to the one described in Sections 3
and 4, except that the platform may own products of its own that it puts out
for rent. Let Sp and So denote respectively the amount of supply generated from
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platform- and individually-owned products. Then, the total amount of supply in
the system is given by S = Sp + So. We assume that renters do not differentiate
between products owned by the platform and those owned by individuals, with
the same rental price applying to both (it is possible of course to consider alter-
native assumptions where renters may exhibit preferences for one over the other).
We also assume that the platform incurs the same ownership cost (per unit of
supply) as individual owners (it is easy to relax this assumption by incorporat-
ing economies/diseconomies of scale). Then, given the rental price p and level of
supply Sp, the platform profit is expressed as v(p, Sp) = γpαSo + pαSp − cSp.
The platform now generates revenue from two sources, peer-to-peer rentals and
rentals of platform-owned products (the first two terms in the above expression),
while incurring the ownership cost for the products it owns (the third term in the
expression). For a fixed price, the introduction of platform-owned products makes
foregoing ownership more attractive, for the likelihood of successfully renting a
product is now higher. Hence, individual ownership decreases and demand for
rentals increases. However, it is not clear what the impact is on α (the likeli-
hood of successfully renting out a product) since the increase in rental demand is
accompanied by an injection of supply from the platform.
It turns out that, in equilibrium,9 both the supply due to individual owners So
and the matching parameter α are decreasing in Sp. This implies that platform
9We can again show that, for any value of platform supply Sp ≥ 0, an equilibrium (θ∗, α∗) exists
and is unique for every feasible combination of parameter values. We can also show that θ∗ and
α∗ are still increasing in c, γ, do, but decreasing in p and dr. In addition, θ∗ increases while α∗
decreases as Sp increases. The analysis is similar to those leading to Theorems 2.1 and 2.12.
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revenue from peer-to-peer rentals would be maximized by the platform not own-
ing products. Therefore, for owning products to be optimal, the platform must
generate sufficient profit from the products it owns. That is, pαSp − cSp must be
sufficiently large. A necessary condition for this to occur is for pα − c > 0 when
Sp = 0. Since α is decreasing in Sp, for relatively large values of Sp to be optimal,
the price must also be relatively high.
The optimal price p∗ and supply level S∗p are difficult to characterize analyt-
ically. However, we observe numerically that the platform would own products
(i.e., S∗p > 0) if and only if the commission rate γ and the cost of ownership c are
sufficiently large (see Figure 2.10). This is consistent with the discussion above,
as pα − c > 0 requires both γ (recall that (1 − γ)pα − c < 0 in the presence of
collaborative consumption) and p to be large, and a large p is only optimal when
c is also large.
(a) do = 0, dr = 0
Figure 2.10: The platform’s incentive in owning products
In summary, there seems to be a relatively narrow range of parameter values
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under which a platform finds it optimal to own products, since doing so canni-
balizes its revenue from peer-to-peer rentals while reducing the likelihood that
products, including its own, find renters. Note also that a platform that owns
products must choose price p such that p > c. In contrast, a price p < c is feasible
for a pure peer-to-peer platform (because owners derive positive utility from using
the product, they are willing to rent it for a price p < c). Hence, a platform that
owns products (or relies exclusively on its own products) may invite competition
from pure peer-to-peer platforms that can afford to charge a lower price (this is
arguably the competitive advantage of many peer-to-peer sharing platforms).
Finally, we note that, as in the original model, the introduction of a platform
(regardless of whether or not it owns products) can lead to either higher or lower
ownership/usage, with higher ownership/usage again more likely when the cost
of ownership is higher (this is true for both the for-profit and not-for-profit plat-
forms). Moreover, we observe that collaborative consumption is more likely to
lead to higher ownership and usage when the platform owns products.
2.6.3 Systems with Heterogeneous Extra Wear and Tear
and Inconvenience Costs
In this section, we consider a setting where individuals are heterogeneous in their
sensitivity to extra wear and tear and inconvenience costs. Individuals are now
differentiated not only by their usage level ξ but also by their sensitivity to extra
wear and tear cost do and inconvenience cost dr. We let f(ξ, do, dr) denote the
distribution of (ξ, do, dr) with f(ξ, do, dr) > 0 for ξ, do, dr ∈ (0, 1). All other
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assumptions remain per the original model in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. We continue
to assume p, do, dr, α, β ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [0, 1) and c ∈ (0, 1).
In the presence of collaborative consumption, each individual must now decide
on one of four strategies: (1) to be an owner and not participate in collaborative
consumption (i.e., an owner who never puts her product up for rent), (2) to be an
owner and participate in collaborative consumption, (3) to be a non-owner and
participate in collaborative consumption (i.e., a non-owner who always attempts
to rent a product), and (4) to be a non-owner and not participate in collaborative
consumption (i.e., a non-owner who always abstains from renting). We refer to
strategies (1)-(4) as ON, OP, NP and NN, respectively. The payoffs associated
with each strategy for an individual with type (ξ, do, dr) are given as follows:
piOP (ξ, do, dr) = ξ + α(1− ξ)((1− γ)p− w)− c;
piON(ξ, do, dr) = ξ − c;
piNP (ξ, do, dr) = βξ(1− p− d); and
piNN(ξ, do, dr) = 0.
Individuals would prefer being owner participants (OP) to being owner non-
participants (ON) if and only if their extra wear and tear cost do ∈ [0, (1 − γ)p].
Similarly, individuals would prefer being non-owner participants (NP) to being
non-owner non-participants (NN) if and only if their inconvenience cost dr ∈
[0, 1− p]. Therefore, in the presence of collaborative consumption, (i) individuals
with (do, dr) ∈ [0, (1 − γ)p] × [0, 1 − p] would choose strategy OP or NP; (ii)
those with (do, dr) ∈ [0, (1 − γ)p] × (1 − p, 1] would choose strategy OP or NN;
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(iii) those with (do, dr) ∈ ((1 − γ)p, 1] × [0, 1 − p] would choose strategy ON or
NP; and (iv) those with (do, dr) ∈ ((1− γ)p, 1]× (1− p, 1] would choose strategy
ON or NN. In each case, there exists a threshold θ(do, dr) such that individuals
with ξ ∈ [θ(do, dr), 1] become owners, and those with ξ ∈ [0, θ(do, dr)) become
non-owners.
The threshold θ(do, dr) can be expressed as follows
θ(do, dr) =

min
{(
c−((1−γ)p−do)α
p+dr+(1−p−dr)α−((1−γ)p−do)α
)+
, 1
}
if (do, dr) ∈ [0, (1− γ)p]× [0, 1− p];
min
{(
c−((1−γ)p−do)α
1−((1−γ)p−do)α
)+
, 1
}
if (do, dr) ∈ [0, (1− γ)p]× (1− p, 1];
min
{(
c
p+dr+(1−p−dr)α
)+
, 1
}
if (do, dr) ∈ ((1− γ)p, 1]× [0, 1− p];
c if (do, dr) ∈ ((1− γ)p, 1]× (1− p, 1].
(2.27)
The resulting demand (generated from non-owner participants) and supply (gen-
erated from owner participants) are respectively given by
D(θ(do, dr)) =
∫
{(ξ,do,dr)∈[0,θ(do,dr))×[0,1]×[0,1−p]}
ξf(ξ, do, dr),
and
S(θ(do, dr)) =
∫
{(ξ,do,dr)∈[θ(do,dr),1]×[0,(1−γ)p]×[0,1]}
(1− ξ)f(ξ, do, dr).
This leads to
α =
D(θ(do, dr))
S(θ(do, dr)) +D(θ(do, dr))
. (2.28)
An equilibrium under collaborative consumption exists if there exist θ∗(do, dr) :
[0, 1]2 → [0, 1] and α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that (2.27) and (2.28) are satisfied.
In the following theorem, we show that an equilibrium under collaborative
consumption continues to exist and is unique.
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Theorem 2.13. A unique equilibrium (θ∗(do, dr), α∗) under collaborative con-
sumption exists for p ∈ (0, 1). In equilibrium, (i) individuals with (ξ, do, dr) ∈
[θ∗(do, dr), 1]× [0, (1−γ)p]× [0, 1] become owner participants (OP); (ii) those with
(ξ, do, dr) ∈ [θ∗(do, dr), 1] × ((1 − γ)p, 1] × [0, 1] become owner non-participants
(ON); (iii) those with (ξ, do, dr) ∈ [0, θ∗(do, dr))×[0, 1]×[0, 1−p] become non-owner
participants (NP); and (iv) those with (ξ, do, dr) ∈ [0, θ∗(do, dr))× [0, 1]× (1−p, 1]
become non-owner non-participants (NN).
Proof. It is clear from (2.27) that θ(do, dr) is decreasing in α for each (do, dr) ∈
[0, 1]2. As a result, the aggragate demand D(θ(do, dr)) and supply S(θ(do, dr))
are respectively decreasing and increasing in α. Therefore, If we let h(α) =
α − D(θ(do,dr))
S(θ(do,dr))+D(θ(do,dr))
, then h is strictly increasing in α. It is easy to see that,
when α = 0,
D(θ(do, dr)) =
∫
{(ξ,do,dr)∈[0,min{ cp+dr ,1})×[0,1]×[0,1−p]}
ξf(ξ, do, dr) > 0,
and that, when α = 1,
S(θ(do, dr)) =
∫
{(ξ,do,dr)∈[( c−((1−γ)p−do)1−((1−γ)p−do))
+
,1]×[0,(1−γ)p]×[0,1]}
(1− ξ)f(ξ, do, dr) > 0.
So, we conclude h(0) < 0 and h(1) > 0. It follows that there exists a unique α∗ ∈
(0, 1) that satisfies (2.28). The corresponding θ∗(w, d) is obtained by replacing α
by α∗ in (2.27).
Theorem 2.13 indicates that individuals with high usage (ξ ≥ θ∗(do, dr)) choose
to be owners, among whom those who participate in collaborative consumption
are less sensitive to extra wear and tear cost (do ≤ (1 − γ)p), and those who
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do not are more sensitive (do > (1 − γ)p). Similarly, individuals with low usage
(ξ < θ∗(do, dr)) choose to be non-owners, among whom those who participate have
low inconvenience cost (dr ≤ 1−p), and those who do not have high inconvenience
cost (dr > 1− p).
As shown in Figure 2.11, collaborative consumption can still lead to either
higher or lower ownership/usage. In particular, as in the basic model, there is a
threshold for ownership/usage in the rental price above which ownership/usage is
higher and below which it is lower. The threshold for ownership is again decreasing
in the cost of ownership, confirming that collaborative consumption is more likely
to lead to higher ownership when the cost of ownership is higher.
Note that, in contrast to the basic model, collaborative consumption is now
possible over the full range of rental prices, including extreme values of both low
and high pricing. This is because there are always individuals with sufficiently low
sensitivity to extra wear and tear and inconvenience costs who would participate.
More importantly, the impact of the rental price on ownership and usage are
no longer monotonic. When price is moderate, ownership and usage (consistent
with the basic model) are monotonically increasing in price. However, when the
rental price is very high, the lack of non-owner participants (NP) eventually drives
ownership and usage down to the levels of no collaborative consumption. Similarly,
when the rental price is very low, the lack of owner participants (OP) eventually
drives ownership and usage up to the levels of no collaborative consumption. As a
result, as price increases, ownership and usage levels first decrease, then increase,
before they decrease again.
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(a) c = 0.3, ξ ∼ U(0, 1), do, dr ∼ Beta(1, 10) (b) c = 0.7, ξ ∼ U(0, 1), do, dr ∼ Beta(1, 10)
(c) c = 0.3, ξ ∼ U(0, 1), do, dr ∼ Beta(1, 10) (d) c = 0.7, ξ ∼ U(0, 1), do, dr ∼ Beta(1, 10)
Figure 2.11: Impact of price on ownership and usage
2.6.4 Systems with Endogenous Usage
In this section, individuals are now no longer differentiated by their usage level but
by their usage valuation, which we denote by η and assume to follow a probability
distribution with a density function f(η). We also assume that the utility derived
by individuals with valuation η is linearly increasing in η and concave increasing in
the usage level ξ. Specifically, the utility derived by an individual with valuation
η who chooses usage level ξ is given by
u(η, ξ) = ηξ − 1
2
ξ2.
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Under this utility function, individuals with usage valuation η maximize their
utility at ξ = η. Hence, the optimal usage is increasing in usage valuation, where
individuals with η = 0 choose no usage and those with η = 1 choose full usage.
In the absence of collaborative consumption, individuals decide on whether
or not to be owners and on their usage levels. In the presence of collaborative
consumption, individuals decide in addition on whether or not to participate in
collaborative consumption. Therefore, as in the previous section, owners can be
classified into owner participants (OP) and owner non-participants (ON) while
non-owners can be classified into non-owner participants (NP) and non-owner
non-participants (NN). The payoffs associated with each of the strategies for an
individual with valuation η and usage ξ are given by
piOP (η, ξ) = ηξ − 1
2
ξ2 + α(1− ξ)((1− γ)p− do)− c;
piON(η, ξ) = ηξ − 1
2
ξ2 − c;
piNP (η, ξ) = β(ηξ − 1
2
ξ2 − (p+ dr)ξ); and
piNN(η, ξ) = 0.
Then, it is easy to see that owners would participate in collaborative consump-
tion if p > do
1−γ , they are indifferent if p =
do
1−γ , and they would not participate
otherwise. Therefore, for collaborative consumption to take place, we must have
p > do
1−γ .
Given that p > do
1−γ , the optimal usage levels are respectively given by ξ
∗
OP (η) =
(η − α((1 − γ)p − do))+; ξ∗ON(η) = η; ξ∗NP (η) = (η − p − dr)+; and ξ∗NN(η) = 0.
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Consequently, the corresponding optimal payoffs are respectively given by
pi∗OP (η) =

1
2
(η − α((1− γ)p− do))2 − (c− α((1− γ)p− do)) if η > α((1− γ)p− do)
−(c− α((1− γ)p− do)) otherwise;
pi∗ON(η) =
1
2
η2 − c;
pi∗NP (η) =

1
2
β(η − p− dr)2 if η > p+ dr
0 otherwise;
pi∗NN(η) = 0.
It is easy to see that pi∗NP (η) > pi
∗
NN(η) if and only if η > p + dr, and pi
∗
OP (η) −
pi∗NP (η) is monotonically increasing for η ∈ [p + dr, 1]. Therefore, collaborative
consumption would take place if there exists θ ∈ (p+ dr, 1) such that
pi∗OP (θ, α) = pi
∗
NP (θ, α). (2.29)
If such a θ exists, individuals with η ∈ [θ, 1] would become owner participants,
those with η ∈ [p + dr, θ) would become non-owner participants, and those with
η ∈ [0, p+ dr) would become non-owner non-participants. The aggregate demand
and supply can then be expressed as
D(θ, α) =
∫
[p+dr,θ)
(η − p− dr)f(η) dη,
and
S(θ, α) =
∫
[θ,1]
(1− η + α((1− γ)p− do))f(η) dη.
This leads to
α =
D(θ, α)
S(θ, α) +D(θ, α)
. (2.30)
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An equilibrium under collaborative consumption exists if there exists (θ∗, α∗) ∈
(p+ d, 1)× (0, 1) that is solution to (2.29) and (2.30).
In the theorem below, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the
existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium under collaborative consumption.
Theorem 2.14. An equilibrium (θ∗, α∗) under collaborative consumption exists
and is unique if and only if p ∈ (
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) ,
√
2c − dr), in which case, indi-
viduals with η ∈ [θ∗, 1] are owner participants (OP), those with η ∈ [p + dr, θ∗)
are non-owner participants (NP), and those with η ∈ [0, p + dr) are non-owner
non-participants (NN).
Theorem 2.14 indicates that collaborative consumption would take place if and
only if p ∈ (
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) ,
√
2c−dr). This condition reduces to (i) p ∈ ( do(1−γ) ,
√
2c−
dr) if c <
1
2
, and (ii) p ∈ (
√
(2c−1)+do
(1−γ) , 1 − d) if c ≥ 12 . Scenario (i) corresponds
to a setting where, in the absence of collaborative consumption, products are
affordable to some. In this case, in the presence of collaborative consumption, if
the rental price is too high (p ≥ √2c− dr), individuals prefer owning to renting.
On the other hand, scenario (ii) corresponds to a setting where, in the absence
of collaborative consumption, there are no owners. In this case, in the presence
of collaborative consumption, if the rental price is too low (p ≤
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) ),
products would still be too expensive to own. In equilibrium, the population is
segmented into OP, NP and NN. As rental price p increases, fewer individuals
are willing to participate as non-owners. Consequently, the population of NP
decreases while the population of NN increases.
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Because usage is endogenous, ownership ω∗ and usage q∗ are no longer mono-
tonic in the rental price p, with both first increasing and then decreasing. This
is illustrated in Figure 2.12. This effect can be explained as follows. When the
rental price initially increases, ownership increases because the rental income ef-
fect dominates. However, further increases in the rental price eventually makes
ownership less desirable because of the diminishing demand from non-owner par-
ticipants (those who decide not to own choose lower levels of usage, with this usage
approaching zero as price approaches the maximum feasible value of 1− dr). The
lack of demand from non-owner participants eventually drives ownership and usage
back down to the same levels as those in the absence of collaborative consumption.
(a) c = 0.2, γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0 (b) c = 0.4, γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0
Figure 2.12: Impact of price on ownership
As shown in Figure 2.12, collaborative consumption can still lead to either
higher or lower ownership. There is again a threshold on the rental price, pω, above
which ownership is higher (and below which it is lower). This threshold is again
decreasing in the cost of ownership, confirming that collaborative consumption is
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more likely to lead to higher ownership when the cost of ownership is higher.
2.6.5 Systems with General Usage Distribution
In this section, we consider the setting where individual usage follows a general
distribution. We can show that Theorem 2.1 continues to hold if the usage distri-
bution has a density function f and f is continuous with f(ξ) > 0 for ξ ∈ (0, 1).
(See the proof of Theorem 2.1.) In particular, ownership and usage are still strictly
decreasing in the cost of ownership c, commission γ, and extra wear and tear cost
do, and strictly increasing in the rental price p and inconvenience cost dr. As a
result, there still exist thresholds pq < pω such that (i) ownership and usage are
both lower if p ≤ pq; (ii) ownership is lower but usage is higher if pq < p ≤ pω;
and (iii) ownership and usage are both higher if p > pω. Moreover, pω remains
decreasing and pq remains first increasing then decreasing in the cost of owner-
ship, indicating that the insights developed from uniform usage distribution are
still valid for general usage distributions.
Of additional interest is the impact of usage distribution on ownership and
usage. We observe that the price threshold pω increases as usage distribution
stochastically increases (i.e., there is more mass on heavy usage). This implies
collaborative consumption is more likely to lead to lower ownership when usage
distribution is stochastically larger. This effect appears to be related to the fact
that pω is decreasing in the cost of ownership (as shown in Proposition 3). When
usage distribution is stochastically larger, there are more owners in the absence of
collaborative consumption (which is similar to the case where the cost of ownership
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is lower). Introducing peer-to-peer product sharing in this case benefits renters
more, for the probability of finding an available product is higher. Therefore,
price has to be higher for collaborative consumption to lead to higher ownership.
Similarly, pq is observed to be mostly increasing in usage distribution (except when
the cost of ownership is relatively low), implying that collaborative consumption
is also more likely to lead to lower usage when usage distribution is stochastically
larger.
Figure 2.13 illustrates the price thresholds pω and pq forBeta(a, b) distributions
with a = 5 and b = 2, 4 . . . , 10 (a smaller b indicates a stochastically larger usage
distribution). As shown in Figure 2.13, pω and pq are mostly increasing in usage
distribution.
(a) γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0 (b) γ = 0.2, do = 0, dr = 0
Figure 2.13: The impact of usage distribution on ownership and usage
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2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.7: We show vr is strictly quasiconcave in θ. This would
imply vr is also strictly quasiconcave in p, for the composition of a quasicon-
cave function and a monotone function is still quasiconcave. To maximize total
revenue, the platform has to balance rental price p and the amount of successful
transactions α(1−θ)2/2. Among the duo, rental price p is a decreasing function in
θ, while the amount of transaction α(1−θ)2/2 is a quasiconcave function in θ that
peaks at θ = 1
2
, the point where rental supply equals rental demand. This implies
vr(θ) in (2.18) is strictly decreasing on [max{12 , θ}, θ]. Therefore, to show vr(θ) is
strictly quasiconcave on [θ, θ], it suffices to show that it is strictly quasiconcave
on (0, 1
2
).
As vr is smooth in θ, we have
∂vr
∂θ
= γ
2
c(2θ2−2θ+1)2(γθ2−2θ+1)+θ3(−4γθ4+(8γ+6)θ3−(8γ+12)θ2+(3γ+11)θ−4)
(γθ−1)2(2θ2−2θ+1)2 .
(2.31)
Note that ∂vr
∂θ
(0) > 0 and ∂vr
∂θ
(1
2
) < 0. We claim that the numerator is strictly
decreasing in θ ∈ (0, 1
2
). Suppose this is true. Then, ∂vr
∂θ
is first positive then
negative on (0, 1
2
), and therefore vr is strictly quasiconcave on (0,
1
2
). To show the
claim is true, we decompose the numerator of (2.31) into g1(θ, γ) = (2θ
2 − 2θ +
1)2(γθ2−2θ+1), and g2(θ, γ) = θ3(−4γθ4+(8γ+6)θ3−(8γ+12)θ2+(3γ+11)θ−4).
It is easy to show that g1 and g2 are both strictly decreasing in θ. 
Proof of Proposition 2.8: We first show that θ∗r is increasing in c. Observe
θ∗r = θ if θ ≥ 12 , and θ∗r < 12 if θ < 12 . As θ = θ∗(1) is increasing in c, it
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suffices to assume θ < 1
2
and show θ∗r is increasing in c in this case. By (2.18),
∂2pip
∂θ∂c
= γ(γθ
2−2θ+1)
(γθ−1)2 > 0 for θ <
1
2
. This implies vr is supermodular in (θ, c) on
[0, 1
2
]2. By the Topkis Theorem (Topkis [1998, Lemma 2.8.1]), θ∗r is increasing in
c.
Next, we show that v∗r is strictly quasiconcave in c. As θ in Theorem 2.1 is
continuously differentiable, ∂vr
∂c
is continuous. By the Envelope Theorem (Milgron
and Segal [2002, Corollary 4]), ∂v
∗
r
∂c
(γ, c) = ∂vr
∂c
(p∗r, γ, c) holds on any compact
interval in (0, 1). As (0, 1) can be covered by an increasing union of compact
subintervals, the envelope equation holds on entire (0, 1). Therefore, we have
∂v∗r
∂c
(γ, c) = γp∗r
2θ∗r (θ∗r−1)(2θ∗r−1)(θ∗2r −θ∗r+1)
(2θ∗2r −2θ∗r+1)2
∂θ
∂c
(p∗r, γ, c). Proposition 2.2 shows
∂θ
∂c
> 0.
So, ∂v
∗
r
∂c
> 0 if θ∗r <
1
2
, ∂v
∗
r
∂c
= 0 if θ∗r =
1
2
, and ∂v
∗
r
∂c
< 0 if θ∗r >
1
2
. As θ∗r is increasing
in c, we conclude v∗r is quasiconcave in c. Moreover, substituting θ with
1
2
in (2.31)
yields ∂vr
∂θ
(1
2
) = γ(2cγ+γ−3)
4(γ−2)2 < 0. This implies θ
∗
r =
1
2
iff θ = 1
2
. Therefore, v∗r is
strictly quasiconcave in c.
It remains to be shown that v∗r has a strictly increasing as well as a strictly
decreasing segment. Given what we have shown, it is sufficient to prove that,
as c ranges through (0, 1), θ = θ(0) (as a function of c) has a segment below 1
2
,
and θ = θ(1) has a segment above 1
2
. From (2.10), θ(0) < 1
2
iff φ(1
2
, 0) > 0, and
θ(1) > 1
2
iff φ(1
2
, 1) < 0. The former is equivalent to c < 1
4
, and the latter to
c > 3
4
− 1
4
γ. Therefore, v∗r is strictly increasing when c <
1
4
, and strictly decreasing
when c > 3
4
− 1
4
γ. As c ranges through (0, 1), both segments are non-empty. 
Proof of Proposition 2.9: By Proposition 4, c ∈ (θ, θ) for (γ, c) ∈ (0, 1)2. As
vr is quasiconcave, ω
∗
r(c) ≤ ωˆ(c) iff θ∗r(c) ≥ c iff ∂vr∂θ (c) ≥ 0. Replacing θ by c in
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(2.31), we have
∂vr
∂θ
(c) =
γ
2
c(1− c)(2c4 − 6c3 + (7 + γ)c2 − 5c+ 1)
(γc− 1)2(2c2 − 2c+ 1)2 .
Let g(c, γ) = 2c4 − 6c3 + (7 + γ)c2 − 5c + 1. Then ∂vr
∂θ
(c) ≥ 0 iff g(c, γ) ≥ 0.
Moreover, g(0, γ) = 1 > 0, g(1, γ) = γ − 1 < 0, and g is strictly convex in c, as
∂2g
∂c2
= 24c2 − 36c + 14 + 2γ > 0. It follows that g(c, γ) = 0 has a unique solution
cr,ω(γ) ∈ (0, 1) with ∂vr∂θ (c) > 0 if c < cr,ω(γ) and ∂vr∂θ (c) < 0 if c > cr,ω(γ). This
implies ω∗r(c) ≤ ωˆ(c) if c ≤ cr,ω(γ) and ω∗r(c) > ωˆ(c) otherwise. It is easy to see
that cr,ω(γ) is strictly increasing in γ. 
Proof of Proposition 2.10: In what follows, we derive the strictly positive
decreasing function γs(c), and show that θ
∗
s ∈ (θ, θ) if and only if γ < γs(c). In
other words, if γ < γs(c), θ
∗
s satisfies
∂vs
∂θ
(θ∗s) = 0. As vs is strictly concave in [0, 1],
this implies θ∗s is also optimal to the social planner’s problem.
We denote by, θ∗c , the unique optimal solution to maxθ∈[0,1] vs for c ∈ [0, 1]. By
the Maximum Theorem and Topkis Theorem, θ∗c is continuously increasing in c.
For c ∈ (0, 1), as
∂vs
∂θ
=
1
4
(−1 + 4c− 2θ + (1− 2θ)
(2θ − 2θ + 1)2 ) (2.32)
is stricly positive when θ = 0, and strictly negative when θ = 1, we know that
vs, apart from being concave, is first increasing, then decreasing on [0, 1]. There-
fore, ∂vs
∂θ
(θ∗c ) = 0. It follows that θ
∗
c satisfies
(2θ∗5c −3θ∗4c +2θ∗3c )
(2θ∗2c −2θ∗c+1)2 = c. Replacing c by
(2θ∗5c −3θ∗4c +2θ∗3c )
(2θ∗2c −2θ∗c+1)2 in (2.17) yields p(θ
∗
c ) =
θ∗2c
(1−γθ∗c )(2θ∗2c −2θ∗c+1) > 0. If p(θ
∗
c ) < 1, then
θ∗c ∈ (θ, θ), in which case, θ∗s = θ∗c . If p(θ∗c ) ≥ 1, then θ∗c ≤ θ, in which case, θ∗s = θ.
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Observe that p(θ∗c ) < 1 iff γ ≤ (θ
∗
c−1)2
θ∗c (2θ∗2c −2θ∗c+1) . So, if we set γs =
(θ∗c−1)2
θ∗c (2θ∗2c −2θ∗c+1) ,
then θ∗s ∈ (θ, θ) if γ < γs, and θ∗s = θ if γ ≥ γs. It is easy to see that γs is
decreasing in θ∗c , and therefore it is decreasing in c. 
Proof of Proposition 2.11: Let g(θ, c) = − θ(θ3−2cθ2+2cθ−c)
((1−θ)2+θ2) . Then, vr(θ, c) =
γ(1−θ)
2(1−γθ)g(θ, c). Let θr be the unique solution to
∂vr
∂θ
=
γ(γ − 1)
2(1− γθ)2 g(θ, c) +
γ(1− θ)
2(1− γθ)Dθg(θ, c) = 0
in (0, 1/2) (which clearly exists as ∂vr
∂θ
(0) > 0 and ∂vr
∂θ
(1/2) < 0), and θs be the
unique solution to
∂vs
∂θ
=
1
4
(−1− 2θ + (1− 2θ)
(2θ2 − 2θ + 1)2 + 4c) = 0
in (0, 1) (which clearly exists as ∂vs
∂θ
(0) > 0 and ∂vs
∂θ
(1) < 0). We claim that θr ≤ θs.
Suppose the claim is true. Then, θ∗r = θ ≤ θ∗s whenever θr < θ, θ∗r = θr ≤ θs = θ∗s
whenever θr, θs ∈ [θ, θ], and θ∗r ≤ θ = θ∗s whenever θs > θ. In all the cases, we
have θ∗r ≤ θ∗s .
To prove the claim that θr ≤ θs, observe that g is strictly concave in θ on [0, 1],
since ∂
2g
∂θ2
= −4θ2(1−θ)2(2θ2−2θ+3)
(2θ2−2θ+1)3 < 0. Let θg be the unique solution to
∂g
∂θ
=
1
2
(−1− 2θ + 1− 2θ
(2θ2 − 2θ + 1)2 + 2c) = 0
in (0, 1). We show that θr ≤ θg ≤ θs.
To see that θr ≤ θg, note that ∂vr∂θ (θg) = γ(γ−1)2(1−γθg)2 g(θg, c) ≤ 0. As vr is strictly
quasiconcave on [0, 1/2], it must be true that θr ≤ θg. To see that θg ≤ θs, note
that h(θ) = −1− 2θ+ 1−2θ
(2θ2−2θ+1)2 is strictly decreasing. So, comparing
∂g
∂θ
and ∂vs
∂θ
,
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it must be true that θg ≤ θs. 
Proof of Proposition 2.12: From (2.26), α is strictly increasing in θ on [0, 1],
and from (2.25), θ is decreasing in α on [0, 1]. As α(0) = 0 and α(1) = 1, a unique
equilibrium exists if θ(0) > 0 and θ(1) < 1. We claim that this is indeed the case
if β˜ < 1−c
1−p˜−d˜r .
It is easy to see that θ(0) is either 1 or c
p+dr
, and therefore θ(0) > 0. It is
also easy to verify that θ(1) is either 0 or c−((1−γ)p−do)
1−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do) , and therefore
θ(1) < 1. In this case, a unique equilibrium under collaborative consumption
exists for each (p, γ, c, do, dr, β˜, p˜, d˜r) ∈ Ω. This implies that
θ∗ =
c− ((1− γ)p− do)α∗
(p+ dr) + [(1− p− dr)− β˜(1− p˜− d˜r)− ((1− γ)p− do)]α∗
always holds. Consequently, we always have c > α∗((1 − γ)p − do) and α∗((1 −
p− dr)− β˜(1− p˜− d˜r)) > c− p− dr in equilibrium.
On the other hand, if β˜ ≥ 1−c
1−p˜−d˜r , then
c−((1−γ)p−do)
1−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do) ≥ 1. In this
case, collaborative consumption does not take place.
Let
h(θ, α, p, γ, c, do, dr, β˜, p˜, d˜r)
=(h1(·), h2(·))
=(θ − c− ((1− γ)p− do)α
(p+ dr) + [(1− p− dr)− β˜(1− p˜− d˜r)− ((1− γ)p− do)]α
, α− θ
2
(1− θ)2 + θ2 ),
and
g(p, γ, c, do, dr, β˜, p˜, d˜r) = (g1(·), g2(·)) = (θ∗(·), α∗(·)).
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Observe that h is continuous on [0, 1]2×Ω unless (α, p, γ, do, dr) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0) or
(α, p, dr) = (0, 0, 0), and that g is the unique solution to h(g(·), p, γ, c, do, dr, β˜, p˜, d˜r) =
0 in (0, 1)2. It is easy to show that g(·) is continuous on Ω.
To show (θ∗, α∗) is continuously differentiable, first note that
D(θ,α)h =
 1 ((1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r))c−(c−p−dr)((1−γ)p−do)((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
− 2θ(1−θ)
[(1−θ)2+θ2]2 1
 .
Also recall that, as θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), we always have α∗((1− p− dr)− β˜(1− p˜− d˜r)) >
c−p−dr and c > α∗((1−γ)p−do). Therefore, D(θ,α)h(θ∗, α∗, p, γ, c, do, dr, β˜, p˜, d˜r)
is always invertible. By the Implicit Function Theorem, g is continuously differ-
entiable, and for each component x,
Dxg = −[D(θ,α)h]−1Dxh,
where
[D(θ,α)h]
−1 =
1
det(D(θ,α)h)
 1 − ((1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r))c−(c−p−dr)((1−γ)p−do)((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
2θ(1−θ)
[(1−θ)2+θ2]2 1
 .
Calculating Dxf for each component x leads to
Dph =
 [c−((1−γ)p−do)](1−α)+(1−γ)α[((1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r))α−(c−p−dr)]((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
0
 ,
Dγh =
 − pα[((1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r))α−(c−p−dr)]((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
0
 ,
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Dch =
 − 1(p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α
0
 ,
Ddoh =
 − α[((1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r))α−(c−p−dr)]((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
0
 ,
Ddrh =
 (1−α)(c−((1−γ)p−do)α)((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
0
 ,
Dβ˜h =
(
− α(1−p˜−d˜r)(c−((1−γ)p−do)α)
((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
)
,
and
Dp˜h = Dd˜rh =
(
β˜α(c−((1−γ)p−do)α)
((p+dr)+[(1−p−dr)−β˜(1−p˜−d˜r)−((1−γ)p−do)]α)2
)
.
It is clear that, in equilibrium, Dph > 0, Dγh < 0, Dch < 0, Ddoh < 0, Ddrh > 0,
Dβ˜h < 0, and Dp˜h = Dd˜h > 0. Therefore, we conclude that
∂θ∗
∂p
< 0, ∂α
∗
∂p
< 0,
∂θ∗
∂γ
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂γ
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂c
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂c
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂do
> 0, ∂α
∗
∂do
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂dr
< 0, ∂α
∗
∂dr
< 0, ∂θ
∗
∂β˜
> 0,
∂α∗
∂β˜
> 0, ∂θ
∗
∂p˜
< 0, ∂α
∗
∂p˜
< 0, ∂θ
∗
∂d˜r
< 0, and ∂α
∗
∂d˜r
< 0. 
Proof of Theorem 2.14: To prove the theorem, we need to show that there
exists a unique solution (θ∗, α∗) to (2.29) and (2.30). In what follows, we tackle
the two equations one at a time.
Claim 1.
α =
D(θ, α)
S(θ, α) +D(θ, α)
admits a unique solution α∗(θ) ∈ [0, 1] for θ ∈ [p+ dr, 1]. α∗(θ) is increasing, and
satisfies α∗(p+ dr) = 0 and α∗(1) = 1.
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Proof. Let
h(θ, α) = α− D(θ, α)
S(θ, α) +D(θ, α)
.
Then h : [p + dr, 1] × [0, 1] → R is decreasing in θ and strictly increasing in α.
This implies, for any θ, there exists at most a single α∗(θ) ∈ [0, 1] such that
h(θ, α∗(θ)) = 0. It is easy to verify that the set of θ that admits α∗(θ) is a closed
convex set [θ1, θ2], and α
∗(θ) is increasing in [θ1, θ2]. It is also easy to verify that
α∗(p+ dr) = 0 and α∗(1) = 1. Therefore, θ1 = p+ dr and θ2 = 1.
Claim 2. Suppose p ∈ (
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) ,
√
2c− dr). Then
pi∗OP (θ, α) = pi
∗
NP (θ, α)
admits a unique solution θ∗(α) ∈ [p + dr, 1] for α ∈ [α1, α2] ⊂ [0, 1]. θ∗(α) is
strictly decreasing, and one of the following is true: (i). 0 = α1 < α2 = 1; (ii).
0 < α1 < α2 = 1 and θ
∗(α1) = 1; (iii). 0 = α1 < α2 < 1 and θ∗(α2) = p + dr; or
(iv). 0 < α1 < α2 < 1, θ
∗(α1) = 1 and θ∗(α2) = p+ dr.
Proof. Let h(θ, α) = (pi∗OP − pi∗NP )(θ, α). Then,
∂h
∂θ
= α(θ − ((1− γ)p− do)) + (1− α)(p+ dr),
and
∂h
∂α
= ((1− γ)p− do)(1− θ + α((1− γ)p− do)) + 1
2
(θ − p− dr)2.
Therefore, h : [p + dr, 1] × [0, 1] → R is strictly increasing in both θ and α. This
implies, for any α, there exists at most a single θ∗(α) ∈ [p + dr, 1] such that
h(θ∗(α), α) = 0. It is easy to verify that the set of α that admits θ∗(α) is a closed
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convex set [α1, α2], and θ
∗(α) is strictly decreasing in [α1, α2]. It remains to be
shown that either (i), (ii), (iii), or (iv) is true.
To begin with, we solve for θ∗(1) =
√
2(c− ((1− γ)p− do)) + ((1− γ)p− do)
and θ∗(0) = p+dr
2
+ c
p+dr
. Note that the assumption
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) < p <
√
2c − dr
implies that θ∗(0) > p + dr, and θ∗(1) < 1. So, if θ∗(0) ≤ 1 and θ∗(1) ≥ p + dr,
then we have case (i).
If θ∗(0) > 1, then (p+dr)2−2(p+dr) + 2c > 0. In this case, we have h(1, 0) =
−1
2
((p+dr)
2−2(p+dr)+2c) < 0, and h(1, 1) = 12(1+((1−γ)p−do)2)−c > 0. So,
there exists α1 ∈ (0, 1) such that h(1, α1) = 0, which also implies that θ∗(α1) = 1.
Similarly, if θ∗(1) < p+dr, then 12(p+dr−((1−γ)p−do))2−(c−((1−γ)p−do)) > 0.
In this case, we have h(p + dr, 0) =
1
2
(p + dr)
2 − c < 0, and h(p + dr, 1) =
1
2
(p+ dr− ((1− γ)p− do))2− (c− ((1− γ)p− do)) > 0. So, there exists α2 ∈ (0, 1)
such that h(p + dr, α2) = 0, which also implies θ
∗(α2) = p + dr. It follows that if
θ∗(0) > 1 and θ∗(1) ≥ p + dr, we have case (ii); If θ∗(0) ≤ 1 and θ∗(1) < p + dr,
we have case (iii); If θ∗(0) > 1 and θ∗(1) < p + dr, we have case (iv). We have
covered all the cases.
To finish the proof, we first show that an equilibrium under collaborative
consumption does not exist for p ≤
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) and p ≥
√
2c − dr. If p ≤ do(1−γ) ,
then ON dominates OP for η ∈ [0, 1]. If do
(1−γ) < p ≤
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) , then
pi∗OP (1, α)− pi∗NP (1, α) =
1
2
(1− α((1− γ)p− do))2 − (c− α((1− γ)p− do))− pi∗NP (1, α)
≤ 1
2
(1 + α2((1− γ)p− do)2)− c
≤ 0,
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in which case, NP dominates OP for η ∈ [p + dr, 1]. On the other hand, if
p ≥ √2c− dr, then
pi∗OP (p+ dr, α)− pi∗NP (p+ dr, α)
=
1
2
((p+ dr)
2 + α2((1− γ)p− do)2) + (1− p− dr)α((1− γ)p− do)− c
≥1
2
(p+ dr)
2 − c
≥0,
in which case, OP dominates NP for η ∈ [p + dr, 1]. In these cases, collaborative
consumption cannot take place, and individuals become ON’s and NN’s.
Now, we show that a unique equilibrium exists for p ∈ (
√
(2c−1)++do
(1−γ) ,
√
2c−dr).
By Claim 1, there is a unique α∗(θ) ∈ [0, 1] for θ ∈ [p + dr, 1] that is a solution
to (2.30). α∗(θ) is increasing, and satisfies α∗(p + dr) = 0 and α∗(1) = 1. By
Claim 2, there is a unique θ∗(α) ∈ [p + dr, 1] for α ∈ [α1, α2] ⊂ [0, 1] that is a
solution to (2.29). θ∗(α) is strictly decreasing, and one of the four cases is true.
Due to the monotonicity of α∗(θ) and θ∗(α), the functions can have at most one
intersection in [p+ d, 1]× [0, 1]. Therefore, every equilibrium is unique. It is easy
to verify that, in either of the four cases, they must intersect each other at some
(θ∗, α∗) ∈ (p+ dr, 1)× (0, 1). We have proved the theorem. 
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2.B An Alternative Model for Matching Param-
eters
In this section, we describe an alternative model for the matching parameters
α and β. Consider a setting similar in all aspects to the basic model described
in Sections 3 and 4, except for the fact that the continuum of individuals is now
approximated by a finite population, and usage is random and arises over multiple
periods. To be precise, we consider a population of finitely many individuals i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N} whose usage per period {Xi} are independent random variables with
mean {ξi}. For example, such a situation arises when, in each period, individual
i would use the product with probability ξi (and, therefore, would not use the
product with probability 1 − ξi). In other words, usage level in each period is
either 1 or 0 with probability ξi and 1− ξi, respectively. In this case, we have
Xi =
 1 if individual i would like to use the product;0 otherwise.
In the presence of collaborative consumption, some individuals become owners
and others become renters. Without loss of generality, the set of owners is assumed
to be {1, . . . ,M} and the rest ({M + 1, . . . , N}) are assumed to be renters. Then,
the aggregate supply S and demand D in a given period can be expressed as
S =
∑M
i=1Xi and D =
∑N
i=M+1Xi. The amount of successful transactions in such
a period is then given by Z = min{S,D}.
In a setting of multiple periods (i.e., t = 1, . . . , T ), the matching parameters
α, which represents the overall fraction of total supply that is matched to renters,
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would be given by
∑T
t=1 Zt/
∑T
t=1 St. Similarly, the matching parameter β, which
represents the overall fraction of total demand that is fulfilled by owners, would
be given by
∑T
t=1 Zt/
∑T
t=1Dt. If individual usage is assumed to be i.i.d. over
time periods, then by the Law of Large Numbers,
lim
T→∞
∑T
t=1 Zt∑T
t=1 St
→ E[Z]
E[S]
a.e.,
and
lim
T→∞
∑T
t=1 Zt∑T
t=1Dt
→ E[Z]
E[D]
a.e.
Therefore, if the number of periods is sufficiently large, the matching probabilities
α and β would be approximately
α =
E[Z]
E[S]
,
and
β =
E[Z]
E[D]
.
The distributions of S and D, and therefore that of Z, depend on the individual
usage distributions (i.e., those of {Xi}). Consequently, as the individual usage
distributions vary, the matching probabilities α and β can take various forms. For
example, when the individual usage levels are distributed such that S and D can
be approximated by exponential random variables, the expected transaction per
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period is given by
E[Z] =
∫
[0,∞)
x
E[S]
e−(
1
E[S]
+ 1
E[D]
)x dx+
∫
[0,∞)
y
E[D]
e−(
1
E[S]
+ 1
E[D]
)y dy
=
1
E[S]
( 1
E[S]
+ 1
E[D]
)2
+
1
E[D]
( 1
E[S]
+ 1
E[D]
)2
=
1
1
E[S]
+ 1
E[D]
,
where E[S] and E[D] are the expectations of S and D, respectively. So, the
matching probabilities would take the form of
α =
E[D]
E[S] + E[D]
,
and
β =
E[S]
E[S] + E[D]
.
We have recovered the approximations in (2.6) and (2.5). The matching friction
in this case is due to the variations in supply and demand. In the case of expo-
nentially distributed supply and demand, the coefficient of variation is 1, and the
matching probabilities satisfy α + β = 1. In what follows we show that the sum
α+ β does not necessarily have to add up to 1, and α+ β > 1 (α+ β < 1) could
happen if the coefficient of variation in supply and demand is smaller (larger) than
1.
For an example of α + β > 1, consider a setting where S and D can be
approximated by uniformly random variables (i.e., S ∼ U [0, 2E[S]] and D ∼
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U [0, 2E[D]]). If E[S] ≤ E[D], we have
E[Z] =
∫
[0,2E[S]]
x(1− x
2E[D]
)
1
2E[S]
dx+
∫
[0,2E[S]]
y(1− y
2E[S]
)
1
2E[D]
dy
= E[S]− 2E[S]
2
3E[D]
+
E[S]2
E[D]
− 2E[S]
2
3E[D]
= E[S]− E[S]
2
3E[D]
.
In this case, α and β would take the form of
α = 1− E[S]
3E[D]
,
and
β =
E[S]
E[D]
− E[S]
2
3E[D]2
.
Similarly, if E[S] > E[D], we have
E[Z] =
∫
[0,2E[D]]
x(1− x
2E[D]
)
1
2E[S]
dx+
∫
[0,2E[D]]
y(1− y
2E[S]
)
1
2E[D]
dy
=
E[D]2
E[S]
− 2E[D]
2
3E[S]
+ E[D]− 2E[D]
2
3E[S]
= E[D]− E[D]
2
3E[S]
.
In this case, α and β would take the form of
α =
E[D]
E[S]
− E[D]
2
3E[S]2
,
and
β = 1− E[D]
3E[S]
.
In both cases, the matching probabilities satisfy α + β > 1. Also, note that the
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coefficient of variation of a U [0, 2b] distribution is
√
3
3
< 1.
For an example of α + β < 1, consider a setting where S and D can be
approximated by geometric random variables (i.e., S ∼ Geo(p1) and D ∼ Geo(p2),
where p1 and p2 are specified as p1 =
1
1+E[S]
and p2 =
1
1+E[D]
, and where the
probability mass functions are given by P (S = x) = (1− p1)xp1 and P (D = y) =
(1− p2)yp2). Then,
E[Z] =
∞∑
x=0
x(1− p2)x(1− p1)xp1 +
∞∑
y=0
y(1− p1)y+1(1− p2)yp2
=
∞∑
x=0
x((1− p1)(1− p2))xp1 +
∞∑
y=0
y((1− p1)(1− p2))y(p2 − p1p2)
=
(1− p1)(1− p2)p1
(p1 + p2 − p1p2)2 +
(1− p1)(1− p2)(p2 − p1p2)
(p1 + p2 − p1p2)2
=
(1− p1)(1− p2)
p1 + p2 − p1p2
It follows that α and β would take the form of
α =
p1(1− p2)
p1 + p2 − p1p2 =
E[D]
1 + E[S] + E[D]
,
and
β =
(1− p1)p2
p1 + p2 − p1p2 =
E[S]
1 + E[S] + E[D]
.
In this case, the matching probabilities satisfy α + β < 1. Also, note that the
coefficient of variation of a Geo(p) distribution is 1√
1−p > 1.
Chapter 3
Inventory Repositioning in
On-Demand Product Rental
Networks
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider a product rental network with a fixed number of rental
units distributed across multiple locations. Inventory level is reviewed periodically
and, in each period, a decision is made on how much inventory to reposition
away from one location to another. Customers may pick a product up without
reservation, and are allowed to keep the product for one or more periods, without
committing to a specific return time or location. Thus, demand is random, and so
are the rental periods and return locations of rented units. Demand that cannot
be fulfilled at the location at which it arises is considered lost and incurs a lost
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sales penalty (or is fulfilled through other means at an additional cost). Inventory
repositioning is costly and the cost depends on both the origins and destinations
of the repositioning. The firm is interested in minimizing the lost revenue from
unfulfilled demand (lost sales) and the cost incurred from repositioning inventory
(repositioning cost). Note that more aggressive inventory repositioning can reduce
lost sales but leads to higher repositioning cost. Hence, the firm must carefully
mitigate the tradeoff between demand fulfillment and inventory repositioning.
Problems with the above features are many in practice. A variety of car and
bike sharing programs allow customers to rent from one location and return the
vehicles to another location (this option is also offered by many traditional car
rental companies with customers given the option of returning a car to a differ-
ent and more convenient location). In the shipping industry, shipping containers
can be rented from one location and returned to a different one. These locations
correspond in some cases to ports in different countries, with the need to reposi-
tion empty containers particularly acute between countries with significant trade
unbalances. In large hospitals, certain medical equipment, such as IV pumps and
wheelchairs, can be checked out from one location and returned to another, re-
quiring staff to periodically rebalance this inventory among the different locations.
In this research, we are in part motivated by Redbox, a DVD rental company.
Redbox rents DVD’s through a network of over 40,000 kiosks in heavily trafficked
areas like grocery stores and fast food restaurants. Redbox allows customers
to rent from one location and return to another. According to Redbox, half
of its customers take advantage of this option. The following is a quote from
Matt James, Vice President of Redbox (SupplyChainBrain [2015]): “This is an
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important part of our value proposition. We want to make it as easy as possible to
rent and return a movie. But on the back end we have to deal with the problems
this creates. In a network as large as Redbox’s, imbalances can become extreme
very quickly. Let’s say two kiosks started with 15 disks of a particular DVD. After
a week or two, one might be down to two disks and the other have 25 or 30 copies.
The first one will probably stock out, which creates a bad customer experience, and
the other will have a lot of disks sitting there and not being productive.” To address
these unbalances, Redbox has developed an information system that allows it to
evaluate inventory levels of its kiosks overnight and determine which kiosks are
under- and which kiosks are over-supplied. This information is then used the
next day by field employees to remove inventory from some kiosks and place it in
others.
We formulate the inventory repositioning problem as a Markov decision pro-
cess. We show that the problem in each period is one that involves solving a
convex optimization problem (and hence can be solved without resorting to an
exhaustive search). More significantly, we show that the optimal policy in each
period can be described in terms of two well-specified regions over the state space.
If the system is in a state that falls within one region, it is optimal not to repo-
sition any inventory (we refer to this region as the “no-repositioning” region). If
the system is in a state that is outside this region, then it is optimal to reposition
some inventory but only such that the system moves to a new state that is on the
boundary of the no-repositioning region. Moreover, we provide a simple check for
when a state is in the no-repositioning region, which also allows us to compute
the optimal policy more efficiently.
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One of the distinctive features of the problem considered lies in its nonlinear
state update function (because of the lost sales feature). This non-linearity in-
troduces technical difficulties in showing the convexity of the problem that must
be solved in each period. To address this difficulty, we leverage the fact that the
state update function is piecewise affine and derive properties for the directional
derivatives of the value function. This approach has potential applicability to
other systems with piecewise affine state update functions. Another distinctive
feature of the problem is the multi-dimensionality of the state and action spaces.
Unlike many classical inventory problems, the optimal inventory repositioning
policy cannot be characterized by simple thresholds in the state space, as increas-
ing inventory at one location requires reducing inventory at some other locations.
Instead, we show that the optimal policy is defined by a no-repositioning region
within which it is optimal to do nothing and outside of which it is optimal to
reposition to the region’s boundary. Such an optimal policy not only generalizes
the threshold policy for two-location problems (i.e., it implies a simple threshold
policy for two-location problems) but also preserves some of the computational
benefits. Therefore, the results in this paper may also be useful in informing
future studies of multi-dimensional problems.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we review related
literature. In Section 3.3, we describe and formulate the problem. In Section 3.4,
we analyze the structure of the optimal policy for the special case of a single
period problem. In Section 3.5, we use the results from the single period problem
to extend the analysis to problems with finitely and infinitely many periods.
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3.2 Related Literature
Our work is related to the literature on inventory transshipment, where transship-
ment refers to the ability to transfer inventory from one location to another (see
Paterson et al. [2011] for a comprehensive review). Much of this literature focuses
on reactive transshipment, where transshipment occurs in response to demand
realization and transshipped inventory can be used immediately to fulfill demand.
Examples include Robinson [1990], Herer et al. [2006], Hu et al. [2008], and Yao
et al. [2015].
A relatively limited number of papers consider proactive transshipment, where
transshipment is carried out before and, in anticipation of, demand realization.
Examples include Karmarkar and Patel [1977], Karmarkar [1981], and Abouee-
Mehrizi et al. [2015]. However, existing analytical results regarding optimal poli-
cies are mostly for problems with a single period. Results for multiple periods
are relatively limited and focus for the most part on systems where unfulfilled de-
mand is back-ordered. Karmarkar [1981] considers a multi-period problem where
unfulfilled demand is backordered and notes the difficulty of treating lost sales.
Abouee-Mehrizi et al. [2015] consider a multi-period two-location problem with
lost sales and show that the optimal policy in this case can be described by mul-
tiple regions, where in each region the optimal policy takes a different form.
Our problem has the feature of proactive transshipment. However, in our case
inventory cannot be replenished from an external supply source (as is the case
in the transshipment literature). Instead, there is a fixed amount of inventory
circulating among the different locations, and a unit that is rented is returned to
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a random location after a random amount of time.
Our work is also related to the literature that considers the allocation of re-
sources in specific product rental networks, such as empty container repositioning
for shipping networks and inventory repositioning in bike/car sharing systems.
The literature on the former is extensive; see Lee and Meng [2015] for a compre-
hensive review. Most of that literature focuses on simple networks and relies on
heuristics when considering more general problems; see for example Song [2005]
and Li et al. [2007]. To our knowledge, there is no result regarding the optimal
policy for a general network.
There is also a growing literature on inventory repositioning in bike/car shar-
ing systems; see for example Freund et al. [2016], Shu et al. [2013], Nair and
Miller-Hooks [2011], and the references therein. Most of this literature focuses
on the static repositioning problem, where the objective is to find the optimal
placement of bikes/cars before demand arises, with no more repositioning being
made afterwards. Much of this literature employs mixed integer programming
formulations and focuses on the development of algorithms and heuristics. A
stream of literature models bike sharing systems as closed queueing networks and
uses steady state approximations to evaluate system performance; see for example
George and Xia [2011] and Fricker and Gast [2016].
Finally, our problem can be viewed as being related to the widely studied
dynamic fleet management problem. The problem involves assigning vehicles to
loads that originate and terminate in different locations over multiple periods.
Recent examples from this literature include Topaloglu and Powell [2006], Godfrey
and Powell [2002], and Powell and Carvalho [1998]. In a typical dynamic fleet
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management problem, movements of all vehicles, both full and empty, are decision
variables. This is in contrast to our problem where the movement of vehicles is in
part determined by uncontrolled events involving rentals with uncertain durations
and destinations, and where decisions involve only the repositioining of unused
assets. Note that most of the literature on dynamic fleet management focuses
on the development of solution procedures but not on the characterization of the
optimal policy.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to characterize the optimal
inventory repositioning policy for a multi-period multi-location product rental
network involving lost sales. Our work, by providing both analysis and solution
procedures for inventory repositioning, contributes to the streams of literature
where inventory repositioning is a prominent feature.
3.3 Model Description
We consider a product rental network consisting of n locations and N rental units.
Inventory level is reviewed periodically and, in each period, a decision is made on
how much inventory to reposition away from one location to another. Inventory
repositioning is costly and the cost depends on both the origins and destinations
of the repositioning. The review periods are of equal length and decisions are
made over a specified planning horizon, either finite or infinite. Demand in each
period is positive and random, with each unit of demand requiring the usage of
one rental unit for one or more periods, with the rental period being also random.
Demand that cannot be satisfied at the location at which it arises is considered
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lost and incurs a lost sales penalty. Units rented at one location can be returned
to another. Hence, not only are rental durations random but also are return
destinations. At any time, a rental unit can be either at one of the locations,
available for rent, or with a customer being rented.
The sequence of events in each period is as follows. At the beginning of the pe-
riod, inventory level at each location is observed. A decision is then made on how
much inventory to reposition away from one location to another. Subsequently,
demand is realized at each location followed by the realization of product returns.
We index the periods by t ∈ N, with t = 1 indicating the first period in the
planning horizon. We let xt = (xt,1, . . . , xt,n) denote the vector of inventory levels
before repositioning in period t, where xt,i denotes the corresponding inventory
level at location i. Similarly, we let yt = (yt,1, . . . , yt,n) denote the vector of
inventory levels after repositioning in period t, where yt,i denotes the corresponding
inventory level at location i. Note that inventory repositioning should always
preserve the total on-hand inventory. Therefore, we require
∑n
i=1 yt,i =
∑n
i=1 xt,i.
Inventory repositioning is costly and, for each unit of inventory repositioned
away from location i to location j, a cost of ci,j is incurred. Let c = (ci,j) denote
the cost vector. Then, the minimum cost associated with repositioning from an
inventory level x to another inventory level y is given by the following linear
program.
minz=(zi,j) 〈c, z〉
subject to
∑n
i=1 zi,j −
∑n
k=1 zj,k = yj − xj ∀ j
z ≥ 0,
(3.1)
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where zi,j denotes the amount of inventory to be repositioned away from location
i to location j and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product of two vectors. The first
constraint ensures that the change in inventory level at each location is consistent
with the amounts of inventory being moved into (
∑
i zi,j) and out of (
∑
k zj,k)
that location. The second constraint ensures that the amount of inventory being
repositioned away from one location to another is always positive so that the
associated cost is accounted for in the objective. Let w = y−x. It is easy to see
that the value of the linear program depends only on w. Therefore, we denote the
value function of (3.1) by C(w) and refer to it as the inventory repositioning cost.
Without loss of generality, we assume that ci,j ≥ 0 satisfy the triangle inequality
(i.e., ci,k ≤ ci,j + cj,k for all i, j, k).
We let dt = (dt,1, . . . , dt,n) denote the vector of random demand in period t,
with dt,i corresponding to the demand at location i. The amount of demand that
cannot be fulfilled is given by (dt,i − yt,i)+ = max(0, dt,i − yt,i). Let β denote the
per unit lost sales penalty. Then, the total lost sales penalty incurred in period t
across all locations is given by
L(yt,dt) = β
n∑
i=1
(dt,i − yt,i)+. (3.2)
We assume that β ≥ ci,j for i 6= j, that is, the cost of lost sales outweighs the
cost of inventory repositioning. Under deterministic demand, this implies that it
is optimal to satisfy as much demand as possible through inventory repositioning.
We also assume that each product can be rented at most once within a review
period, that is, rental periods are longer than review periods.
To model the randomness in both the rental periods and return locations, we
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assume that, at the end of each period, a random fraction pt,i of all the rented
units N −∑i(yt,i − dt,i)+ is returned to location i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with
the rest continuing to be rented. This indicates that a rented unit is memoryless
about when and where it was rented, and, for a given period, all rented units have
the same probability of being returned to a specific location at a specific time.
Let pt denote the vector of random fractions (pt,1, . . . , pt,n). Then pt must
satisfy
∑n
i=1 pt,i ≤ 1. The case where
∑n
i=1 pt,i < 1 corresponds to a setting
where rental periods can be greater than one, while the case where
∑n
i=1 pt,i = 1
corresponds to a setting where rental periods are equal to 1. Let µt denote the
joint distribution of dt and pt. We assume that the random sequence (dt,pt)
is independent over time, and the expected aggregate demand in each period
is finite (i.e.,
∫
[0,∞)
∑n
i=1 dt,i dµt < +∞). We do not assume dt and pt to be
independent. Nor do we require µt to have a density (or, equivalently, to be
absolutely continuous).
Our modeling of unit return involves two types of memorylessness: (1) memo-
rylessness in origin, that unit return is independent of unit origin, and (2) memo-
rylessness in time, that unit return is independent of elapsed rental time. The first
type of memorylessness is assumed for ease of exposition. Our main results con-
tinue to hold if we were to differentiate rented units by origin and associate each
with a vector of random return fractions (because of the resulting cumbersome
notation, we forgo this minor generality). On the other hand, the second type of
memorylessness is crucial to our analysis. This assumption is justified if the rental
duration can be approximated by a Geometric distribution (essentially, settings
where the probability mass function for the rental duration decays exponentially
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over time).
The model we described can be formulated as a Markov decision process where
system states correspond to the set of vectors of inventory levels xt and the state
space is specified by the n–dimensional simplex
S =
{
(x1, . . . , xn) :
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ N, x1, . . . , xn ≥ 0
}
. (3.3)
Actions correspond to the set of vectors of inventory levels yt. Given state x, the
action space is specified by the (n−1)–dimensional simplex
AI =
{
(y1, . . . , yn) :
n∑
i=1
yi =
n∑
i=1
xi, y1, . . . , yn ≥ 0
}
, (3.4)
where I =
∑
i xi denotes the amount of total on-hand inventory. The transition
probabilities are induced by the state update function xt+1 = τ(yt,dt,pt), where
τ(·) is given by
τ(y,d,p) = (y − d)+ + (N −
∑
i
(yi − di)+)p. (3.5)
Specifically, given a state x and an action y, the repositioning cost is given by
C(y − x), and the expected lost sales penalty is given by
lt(y) = β
∫ ∑
i
(dt,i − yt,i)+ dµt. (3.6)
The cost function is the sum of the inventory repositioning cost and lost sales
penalty, and is hence given by
rt(x,y) = C(y − x) + lt(y). (3.7)
The objective is to minimize the expected discounted cost over a specified planning
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horizon. In the case of a finite planning horizon with T periods, the optimality
equations are given by
vt(xt) = min
yt∈AI
rt(xt,yt) + ρ
∫
vt+1(xt+1) dµt (3.8)
for t = 1, . . . , T , and
vT+1(xT+1) = 0, (3.9)
where ρ ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor.
It is useful to note that the problem to be solved in each period can be expressed
in the following form:
vt(xt) = min
yt∈AI
C(yt − xt) + ut(yt), (3.10)
where
ut(yt) =
∫
Ut(yt,dt,pt) dµt, (3.11)
and
Ut(yt,dt,pt) = L(yt,dt) + ρvt+1(xt+1). (3.12)
Properties of vt, ut and Ut will be discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5.
We conclude this section by describing properties of the repositioning cost C(·)
defined by (3.1). These properties will be useful for characterizing the optimal
policy in subsequent sections. First, the domain of C(·) is given by
dom(C) = {w : w = y − x, where x ∈ S and y ∈ AI} . (3.13)
As a linear transformation of a polyhedron, dom(C) is also a polyhedron. It is
easy to see that (3.1) is bounded feasible. Therefore, an optimal solution to (3.1)
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exists and the strong duality holds. The dual linear program can be written as
follows.
C(w) = maxλ=(λ1,...,λn) 〈λ,w〉
subject to λj − λi ≤ ci,j ∀ i, j.
(3.14)
Property 3.1. C(·) is convex, continuous, and positively homogeneous.
Proof. It is clear from (3.14) that C(·) is positively homogeneous. As the pointwise
supremum of a collection of convex and lower semicontinuous functions (〈λ,w〉
for each λ), C is also convex and lower semicontinuous. It is well known that a
convex function on a locally simplicial convex set is upper semicontinuous (Rock-
afellar [1970] Theorem 10.2). Therefore, as dom(C) is a polyhedron, C must be
continuous.
Due to the triangle inequality, it is not optimal to simultaneously move inven-
tory into and out of the same location. This property can be stated as follows.
Property 3.2. There exists an optimal solution z to (3.1) such that
∑
i
zi,j = (yj − xj)+ and
∑
k
zj,k = (yj − xj)− ∀ j.
Proof. It is easy to see that an equivalent condition is zi,jzj,k = 0 for all i, j, k.
To show this is true, suppose z is an optimal solution and there exists i, j, k such
that zi,j, zj,k > 0. If i = k, we can set at least one of zi,j and zj,i to 0 without
violating the constraints. If i 6= k, we can set at least one of zi,j and zj,k to 0, and
increase zi,k accordingly. In both cases, the resulting objective is at least as good.
Repeating this for all i, k and j can enforce this condition for all i, k and j.
Property 3.2 leads to the following bound for the repositioning cost C(w).
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Property 3.3.
C(w) ≤ β
2
∑
i
|wi|. (3.15)
Proof. By Property 3.2 and the fact that ci,j ≤ β, there exists an optimal solution
z to (3.1) such that C(w) =
∑
i,j ci,jzi,j =
1
2
∑
j
∑
i ci,jzi,j +
1
2
∑
j
∑
i cj,izj,i ≤
β
2
∑
j w
+
j +
β
2
∑
j w
−
j =
β
2
∑
j |wj|.
It is easy to see that, in (3.15), the equality holds if ci,j = β for all i, j. Therefore,
the bound is tight. In Section 3.4, we will use Property 3.3 to derive an important
bound on the directional derivatives of the value function.
3.4 One-Period Problem
In this section, we study the following convex optimization problem
V (x) = min
y∈AI
C(y − x) + u(y) for x ∈ S, (3.16)
where S is the state space specified by (3.3), AI is the decision space specified by
(3.4), C(·) is the repositioning cost specified by (3.1), and u(·) is assumed to be a
convex and continuous function that maps S into R. In the one-period problem,
u(·) is simply the expected lost sales penalty l(·). In the multi-period problem, as
shown in (3.10), the problem to be solved in each period is also of the form (3.16).
3.4.1 Characterization of the Optimal Policy
The principal result of this section is the characterization of the optimal policy
through the no-repositioning set, the collection of inventory levels from which no
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repositioning should be made. The no-repositioning set for a function u(·) when
the total on-hand inventory level is I can be defined as follows:
Ωu(I) = {x ∈ AI : u(x) ≤ C(y − x) + u(y) ∀ y ∈ AI}. (3.17)
By definition, no repositioning should be made from inventory levels inside Ωu(I).
In the following theorem, we show that Ωu(I) is non-empty, connected and com-
pact and, for inventory levels outside Ωu(I), it is optimal to reposition to some
point on the boundary of Ωu(I). In what follows, we denote the boundary of a
set E by ∂E, and the interior of E by E◦.
Theorem 3.1. The no-repositioning set Ωu(I) is nonempty, connected and com-
pact for all I ∈ [0, N ]. An optimal policy pi∗ to (3.16) satisfies
pi∗(x) = x if x ∈ Ωu(I);
pi∗(x) ∈ ∂Ωu(I) if x /∈ Ωu(I).
(3.18)
Proof. Let y∗(x) = {y ∈ AI : V (x) = C(y − x) + u(y)} be the set of optimal
solutions corresponding to the system state x ∈ S. It is easy to verify that
Ωu(I) = ∪x∈AIy∗(x). (3.19)
As C(·) and u(·) are continuous and AI is compact, by Berge’s Maximum The-
orem, y∗(·) is a nonempty-valued and compact-valued upper hemicontinuous1
correspondence. As C(·) and u(·) are also convex, y∗(·) is also convex-valued.
So, it is clear from (3.19) that Ωu(I) is nonempty. To show Ωu(I) is compact,
1Upper hemicontinuity can be defined as follows. Suppose X and Y are topological spaces. A
correspondence f : X → P(Y ) (power set of Y ) is upper hemicontinuous if for any open set V
in Y , f−1(V ) = {x ∈ X|f(x) ⊂ V } is open in X.
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suppose y1,y2, . . . is a sequence in Ωu(I) such that yn ∈ y∗(xn) for n ∈ N and
yn → y. We need to show that y ∈ Ωu(I). By passing through a subsequence,
we may assume that ynk ∈ y∗(xnk), xnk → x and ynk → y. As y∗(·) is compact-
valued, by the Closed Graph Theorem, y∗(·) has a closed graph. This implies
that y ∈ y∗(x) ⊂ Ωu(I), and therefore Ωu(I) is compact. To show that Ωu(I)
is connected, suppose the reverse is true. Then, there exist open sets V1, V2 in
AI such that V1 ∩ V2 = ∅, V1 ∪ V2 ⊃ Ωu(I), and V1 ∩ Ωu(I) and V2 ∩ Ωu(I) are
nonempty. As y∗(·) is convex-valued, this implies that, for any x ∈ AI , y∗(x) is
either in V1 or in V2, but not both. Let U1 = y
∗−1(V1) and U2 = y∗−1(V2). Then
U1, U2 are open, U1∩U2 = ∅, U1∪U2 ⊃ AI , and U1∩AI and U2∩AI are nonempty.
This implies that the (n−1)–dimensional simplex AI is not connected. We have
reached a contradiction. Therefore, Ωu(I) is also connected.
To show that pi∗ is optimal, note that pi∗(x) = x for x ∈ Ωu(I) is clear from
(3.17). If x /∈ Ωu(I), then, by (3.19), pi∗(x) ∈ Ωu(I). Now, suppose there exists
pi∗(x) = y ∈ Ωu(I)◦, then y + t(x − y) ∈ Ωu(I) for small enough t > 0. Set
z = y + t(x − y). Then u(z) + C(z − x) ≤ u(y) + C(y − z) + C(z − x) =
u(y)+ tC(y−x)+(1− t)C(y−x) = u(y)+C(y−x). So, z is as good a solution
as y. Therefore, there exists an optimal solution pi∗(x) ∈ ∂Ωu(I) if x /∈ Ωu(I).
3.4.2 Characterization of the No-Repositioning Set
Solving a nondifferentiable convex program such as (3.16) usually involves some
computational effort. One way to reduce this effort, suggested by Theorem 3.1, is
to characterize the no-repositioning set Ωu(I). Characterizing the no-repositioning
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set not only solves the optimization problem for points inside Ωu(I), but also
reduces the search space to ∂Ωu(I) for points outside Ωu(I). To state our results,
we introduce the following notation for convex functions.
Suppose u(·) is a convex function on Rn with effective domain S.2 Let
u′(x; z) = lim
t↓0
u(x+ tz)− u(x)
t
(3.20)
denote the directional derivative of u(·) at x with respect to z. It is well known
that u′(x; z) is well defined for x ∈ S and z ∈ Rn, and u′(x; ·) is convex and
positively homogeneous with u′(x; 0) = 0 and −u′(x;−z) ≤ u′(x; z). We call z a
feasible direction at x if x+ tz ∈ S for small enough t > 0. Of course, for x ∈ S◦,
all the directions are feasible. Let
H = {z ∈ Rn :
∑
i
zi = 0}. (3.21)
Then a feasible direction at x in H satisfies x + tz ∈ AI for small enough t > 0.
In the context of our problem, a feasible direction in H represents an inventory
repositioning that preserves the level of total on-hand inventory. By convention,
z is said to be a subgradient of u(·) at x if u(y) ≥ u(x)+ 〈z,y−x〉 for all y. The
set of all subgradients of u(·) at x is called the subdifferential of u(·) at x and is
denoted by ∂u(x). It is well known that ∂u(x) is nonempty, closed and convex
for x ∈ S◦.
In what follows, we provide a series of first order characterizations of Ωu(I),
the first of which relies on the directional derivatives.
2An equivalent approach is to assume u : S → R is convex and set u(x) = +∞ for x /∈ S.
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Proposition 3.2. x ∈ Ωu(I) if and only if
u′(x; z) ≥ −C(z) (3.22)
for any feasible direction z at x in H.
Proof. Suppose x ∈ Ωu(I). Take any feasible direction z at x in H. Then, by
(3.17),
u(x+ tz)− u(x)
t
≥ −C(z)
for t > 0. Taking the limit as t ↓ 0, we have u′(x; z) ≥ −C(z). Conversely,
suppose u′(x; z) ≥ −C(z) for any feasible direction z at x in H. Let φ(t) =
u(x + tz). Then, φ(·) is convex, φ(0) = u(x), and φ′(0+) = u′(x; z) ≥ −C(z).
By the subgradient inequality, tφ′(0+) +φ(0) ≤ φ(t). This implies that −tC(z) +
u(x) ≤ u(x + tz) is true for any feasible direction z at x in H. Therefore, we
have x ∈ Ωu(I).
Proposition 3.2 is essential for several subsequent results. However, using
Proposition 3.2 to verify whether a point lies inside the no-repositioning set is com-
putationally impractical, as it involves checking an infinite number of inequalities
in the form of (3.22). In the following proposition, we provide a second charac-
terization of Ωu(I) using the subdifferentials.
Proposition 3.3. x ∈ Ωu(I) if
∂u(x) ∩ G 6= ∅, (3.23)
where G = {(y1, . . . , yn) : yi − yj ≤ cij ∀ i, j}. If x ∈ S◦, then the converse is also
true.
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Proof. For the “if” part, suppose x /∈ Ωu(I). Then, there exists y ∈ AI such that
u(x) > C(y − x) + u(y). Take any g ∈ ∂u(x). By the subgradient inequality,
u(x) + 〈g,y − x〉 ≤ u(y). It follows that
C(y − x) < −〈g,y − x〉.
Suppose z = (zij) is an optimal solution to problem (3.1). Then C(y − x) =∑
i
∑
j cijzij, and by Property 3.2, −〈g,y−x〉 =
∑
i gi(yi−xi)−−
∑
j gj(yj−xj)+ =∑
i
∑
j(gi − gj)zij. So, we have∑
i
∑
j
cijzij <
∑
i
∑
j
(gi − gj)zij.
Hence, there exists i and j such that gi − gj > cij. This implies g /∈ G.
For the “only if” part, suppose x ∈ S◦ and x ∈ Ωu(I). Assume ∂u(x)∩G = ∅.
We will show that this leads to a contradiction. Let P be the orthogonal projection
from Rn to the subspace H = {x ∈ Rn : ∑i xi = 0}. Then
P (x) = x−
∑
i xi
n
e,
where e = (1, . . . , 1) in Rn. Noting that G + αe ⊂ G for any α ∈ R, it is easy to
verify that
∂u(x) ∩ G = ∅ if and only if P (∂u(x)) ∩ P (G) = ∅.
As P (∂u(x)) is closed and P (G) is compact, by Hahn-Banach Theorem, there
exists z ∈ H, a ∈ R and b ∈ R such that
〈g, z〉 < a < b < 〈λ, z〉
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for every g ∈ P (∂u(x)) and for every λ ∈ P (G), or equivalently, as 〈g, z〉 =
〈P (g), z〉 and 〈λ, z〉 = 〈P (λ), z〉, for every g ∈ ∂u(x) and for every λ ∈ G.
As z is a feasible direction in H at x ∈ Ωu(I), by Proposition 3.2, we have
u′(x; z) ≥ −C(z). It follows that
sup{〈g, z〉 : g ∈ ∂u(x)} = u′(x; z) ≥ −C(z).
So, we have
−C(z) ≤ a < b < 〈λ, z〉
for every λ ∈ G. However, by the dual formulation (3.14), there exists λ ∈
{(y1, . . . , yn)|yj − yi ≤ cij ∀ i, j} such that 〈λ, z〉 = C(z), or equivalently,
〈−λ, z〉 = −C(z). Recognizing −λ ∈ G leads to the contradiction. Therefore,
∂u(x) ∩ G 6= ∅.
Proposition 3.3 suggests whether a point lies inside the no-repositioning set
depends on whether u(·) has certain subgradients at this point. Such a character-
ization is useful if we can compute the subdifferential ∂u(x). In particular, if u(·)
is differentiable at x, then ∂u(x) consists of a single point u′(x). In this case, the
characterization of Ωu(I) can be further simplified.
Corollary 3.4. Suppose u(·) is differentiable at x ∈ S. Then, x ∈ Ωu(I) if and
only if
∂u
∂xi
(x)− ∂u
∂xj
(x) ≤ cij (3.24)
for all i, j.
Proof. If u(·) is differentiable at x, then ∂u(x) = {u′(x)} = {( ∂u
∂x1
(x), . . . , ∂u
∂xn
(x))}.
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In this case, it is easy to see that (3.23) is simplified to (3.24). To show that
x ∈ Ωu(I) implies (3.24) for x ∈ ∂S. Note that the equality sup{〈g, z〉 : g ∈
∂u(x)} = 〈u′(x), z〉 = u′(x; z) now holds for x ∈ ∂S. The rest of the proof is the
same as Proposition 3.3.
Corollary 3.4 implies that, for a point at which u(·) is differentiable, determin-
ing its optimality only involves checking n(n−1) inequalities. In our context, u(·)
in the one-period problem is differentiable in S◦ if the demand distribution has
a density. In Section 3.5, we show that the functions (ut(·)) in the multi-period
problem are differentiable in S◦ if the probability distribution µt has a density for
all t and the no-repositioning set Ωu(I) contains no point on the boundary for
I ∈ (0, N).
The no-repositioning set Ωu(I) can take on many forms. In what follows,
we characterize the no-repositioning set for several important special cases, the
first of which corresponds to a network with two locations. In this case, the no-
repositioning set corresponds to a closed line segment with the boundary being
the two end points. The optimal policy is a state-dependent two-threshold policy.
Example 3.1. Suppose n = 2. By Proposition 3.2, Ωu(I) = {(x, I − x) : x ∈
[s1(I), s2(I)]} for I ∈ [0, N ], where s1(I) = inf{x : u((x, I − x); (1,−1)) ≥ −c21}
and s2(I) = sup{x : −u((x, I−x); (−1, 1)) ≤ c12}. An optimal policy pi∗ to (3.16)
satisfies
pi∗(x, I − x) = (s1(I), I − s1(I)) if x < s1(I),
pi∗(x, I − x) = (x, I − x) if s1(I) ≤ x < s2(I),
pi∗(x, I − x) = (s2(I), I − s2(I)) if x ≥ s2(I).
107
In Example 3.1, the optimal policy is described by two thresholds s1(I) < s2(I)
on the on-hand inventory level x at location 1. If x is lower than s1, it is optimal
to bring the inventory level up to s1 by repositioning inventory from location 2
to location 1. On the other hand, if x is greater than s2, it is optimal to bring
the inventory level at location 1 down to s2. When x falls between s1 and s2, it
is optimal not to reposition as the benefit of inventory repositioning cannot offset
the cost.
The second case corresponds to when u(·) is a convex quadratic function. In
this case, the no-repositioning set is a polyhedron defined by n(n − 1) linear
inequalities.
Example 3.2. Suppose u(y) = 〈By,y〉+〈b,y〉+b and B is positive semidefinite.
By Corollary 3.4, Ωu(I) = {y ∈ AI : (2〈Bi,y〉+ bi)− (2〈Bj,y〉+ bj) ≤ ci,j ∀ i, j},
where Bi is the i-th row of B.
An approximate solution approach can be developed based on approximating the
function u(·) in each period by a differentiable convex function. Such an approach
would benefit not only from simple characterizations of the no-repositioning set,
but also from various efficient algorithms in convex optimization. In particular,
in the case where u(·) is approximated by a convex quadratic function, the no-
repositioning set is characterized as in Example 3.2 and quadratic programming
can be used as the solution procedure for points lying outside the no-repositioning
set. (See Keshavarz and Boyd [2014] for an example of quadratic approximate
dynamic programming.)
We point out that, in general, the no-repositioning set can be non-convex.
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This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.3. Suppose u(y) = y31 + y
2
2 + y
2
3 and ci,j = 0.5. Then, the no-
repositioning set is characterized by Ωu(I) = {y ∈ AI : −0.5 ≤ 3y21 − 2y3 ≤
0.5,−0.5 ≤ 3y21 − 2y2 ≤ 0.5,−0.5 ≤ 2y2 − 2y3 ≤ 0.5}.
The no-repositioning set in Example 3.3 is not convex because the region under
the parabolas 2y2 − 3y21 = 0.5 and 2y3 − 3y21 = 0.5 is not convex. See Figure 3.1
for the case where I = y1 + y2 + y3 = 1.
Figure 3.1: An illustration of a non-convex no-repositioning set
3.4.3 Properties of the Value Function
So far, u(·) is assumed to be convex and continuous in S. It turns out that, in
our context, u(·) also satisfies the following important property:
u′(x; z) ≤ β
∑
i
|zi| for x ∈ S◦ and z ∈ Rn. (3.25)
This property is clearly satisfied by the expected lost sales penalty l(·). In section
3.5, we show that the property is also satisfied by the functions (ut(·)) in the
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multi-period problem. Moreover, (3.25) implies that (i) |u′(x; z)| ≤ β∑i |zi| for
any feasible direction z at x ∈ S; (ii) u(·) is Lipschitz continuous; and (iii) ∂u(x)
is nonempty for x ∈ S. A proof of this result can be found in Lemma 3.12 in the
Appendix.
In the following lemma, we summarize the critical properties for the value
function V (·) in our context.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose u′(x; z) ≤ β∑i |zi| for x ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn. Then, the value
function V (·) is convex and continuous in S with ΩV (I) = AI for I ∈ [0, N ]. For
each x ∈ S, the directional derivatives satisfy
V ′(x; z) ≤ β
∑
i
|zi| (3.26)
for any feasible direction z, and
V ′(x; z) ≤ β
2
∑
i
|zi| (3.27)
for any feasible direction z in H.
Proof. To show that V (·) is convex, suppose y1 and y2 are optimal solutions of
(3.16) for x1 and x2, respectively. Let I1 =
∑
i x1,i and I2 =
∑
i x2,i. Then,
λy1 + (1− λ)y2 ∈ DλI1+(1−λ)I2 and V (λx1 + (1− λ)x2) ≤ u(λx1 + (1− λ)x2) +
C(λ(y1 − x1) + (1 − λ)(y2 − x2)) ≤ λV (x1) + (1 − λ)V (x2). Continuity follows
from Berge’s Maximum Theorem, as the set-valued map x 7→ AI is continuous.
Moreover, ΩV (I) = AI since V admits no improvement in AI .
To show the result in (3.26), suppose z is a feasible direction at x ∈ S. Let
y be an optimal solution to (3.16) for x. By Lemma 3.13 in the Appendix,
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there exists w such that
∑
i |wi| ≤
∑
i |zi|, (y + tw) − (x + tz) ∈ dom(C), and
C((y+tw)−(x+tz)) ≤ C(y−x) for small enough t. So, we have V (x+tz)−V (x)
t
≤
u(y+tw)+C((y+tw)−(x+tz))−u(y)−C(y−x)
t
≤ u(y+tw)−u(y)
t
. Taking limits on both
sides leads to V ′(x; z) ≤ u′(y;w) ≤ β∑i |wi| ≤ β∑i |zi|, where the second
inequality follows from Lemma 3.12 in the Appendix.
To show the result in (3.27), suppose z is a feasible direction at x in H. Then
y = x+tz ∈ AI for small enough t > 0, or equivalently, x = y+sz for some s < 0.
As V (·) is convex, φ(s) = V (y + sz) is convex. So, as s < 0, we have V ′(x; z) =
V ′(y + sz; z) = φ′(s+) ≤ φ′(0−) = −V ′(y;−z). As ΩV (I) = AI , by Proposition
3.2, −V ′(y;−z) ≤ C(−z). So, by Property 3.3, V ′(x; z) ≤ β
2
∑
i |zi|.
The bound established in (3.26) serves as a general bound for all feasible directions,
whereas the one established in (3.27), albeit sharper, is more restrictive and only
applicable to feasible directions in H. We can combine these two bounds together
to form a sharper bound for feasible directions z /∈ H. This involves decomposing
z into z1 + z2 such that z1 ∈ H. Such a technique proves to be useful for the
multi-period analysis.
Corollary 3.6. Suppose V (·) is convex and continuous in S, and V ′(·; ·) satisfies
(3.26) and (3.27). If z = z1+z2 is a feasible direction at x ∈ S such that z1 ∈ H,
then |V ′(x; z)| ≤ β
2
∑
i |z1,i|+ β
∑
i |z2,i|.
Proof. For x ∈ S◦, both z1 and z2 are feasible directions. Therefore, for x ∈ S◦,
we have V ′(x; z) ≤ V ′(x; z1) + V ′(x; z2) ≤ β2
∑
i |z1,i| + β
∑
i |z2,i|. The rest of
the proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.12 (i) in the Appendix.
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We conclude this section with a result concerning the differentiability of V (·).
It turns out that if u(·) is differentiable and the no-repositioning set contains no
point on the boundary, then V (·) is also differentiable.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose y ∈ S◦ is an optimal solution to (3.16) for x ∈ S◦.
If u(·) is differentiable at y, then V (·) is also differentiable at x. Consequently,
if u(·) is differentiable in S◦ and ΩuI ⊂ A◦I for I ∈ (0, N), then V (·) is also
differentiable in S◦.
Proof. By assumption, V (x) = C(y − x) + u(y) and V (x + tz) ≤ C(y − x) +
u(y + tz) for any direction z. Therefore, we have V (x+tz)−V (x)
t
≤ u(y+tz)−u(y)
t
.
Taking limits as t ↓ 0 on both sides leads to V (x; z) ≤ u(y; z). This implies that
∂V (x) ⊂ ∂u(y). As ∂u(y) contains a single point u′(y), ∂V (x) also contains a
single point V ′(y).
3.5 Multi-Period Problem
In this section, we return to the study of the multi-period problem. The optimality
equations are given by (3.8) and (3.9). It is clear from (3.11) that the problem
to be solved in each period can be reduced to (3.16) with ut(·) in place of u(·).
Consequently, the optimal decision rule in each period will have the same form as
the one-period problem if the functions (ut(·)) are convex and continuous in S.
Recall that
ut(y) =
∫
Ut(y,d,p) dµt,
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where
Ut(y,d,p) = Lt(y,d) + ρvt+1(τ(y,d,p)).
If the state update function τ(·,d,p) is linear, then convexity is preserved through
vt+1(τ(·,d,p)). As a result, Ut,d,p(·) = Ut(·,d,p) and therefore ut(·) is convex.
However, with nonlinear state updates, this is not always the case. In our con-
text, the state update function is piecewise affine, with the domain of each affine
segment specified by a polyhedron. This implies that vt+1(τ(·,d,p)) is not nec-
essarily convex, but instead is piecewise convex. In spite of this, we show that
Ut,d,p(·) and therefore ut(·) in our context is always convex.
Lemma 3.8. Suppose vt+1(·) is convex and continuous in S, v′t+1(x; z) ≤ β
∑
i |zi|
for any feasible direction z, and v′t+1(x; z) ≤ 12β
∑
i |zi| for any feasible direction
z in H. Then ut(·) is convex and continuous in S, and u′t(y; z) ≤ β
∑
i |zi| for
y ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn.
Before proceeding further, we should clarify the technique that we use to prove
the convexity of Ut,d,p(·). Suppose vt+1(·) is convex and continuous. As the state
update function τ(·,d,p) is piecewise affine, Ut,d,p(·) is piecewise convex, with the
domain of each convex segment specified by a polyhedron {y ∈ S : yi ≤ di for i ∈
J, yi ≥ di for i /∈ J} for some J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}. The set of these polyhedrons forms
a partition of S. Given these conditions, it can be shown that Ut,d,p(y) is convex
if and only if
−Ut,d,p(y;−z) ≤ Ut,d,p(y; z) (3.28)
for y ∈ S for z ∈ Rn. (A proof of this result can be found in Proposition 3.15 in the
Appendix.) To establish the inequality (3.28), it is crucial that v′t+1(x; z) satisfies
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the two bounds established in (3.26) and (3.27) (and therefore the statement in
Corollary 3.6). For these bounds to hold for all t, we must also prove that u′t(y; z)
satisfies the condition specified in (3.25) (on account of Lemma 3.5). This in turn
requires us to show that (analogous to (3.25))
Ut,d,p(y; z) ≤ β
∑
i
|zi| for y ∈ S◦ and z ∈ Rn. (3.29)
The proof of Lemma 3.8 is somewhat lengthy and can be found in the Appendix.
From Lemma 3.8, we are able to conclude that, for each period, the opti-
mization problem to be solved is convex and the optimal policy is of the form
(3.18). Moreover, the resulting no-repositioning sets and value functions continue
to possess the properties laid out in Section 3.4.
Theorem 3.9. The functions (ut(·)) are convex and continuous in S, with u′t(y; z) ≤
β
∑
i |zi| for y ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn. The no-repositioning set Ωut(I) is nonempty,
connected and compact for all I ∈ [0, N ], and can be characterized as in Propo-
sition 3.2, 3.3 and Corollary 3.4. An optimal policy pi∗ = (pi∗1, . . . , pi
∗
T ) to the
multi-period problem satisfies
pi∗t (xt) = xt if xt ∈ Ωut(I);
pi∗t (xt) ∈ ∂Ωut(I) if xt /∈ Ωut(I).
(3.30)
The value functions (vt(·)) are convex and continuous in S, with v′t(x; z) ≤
β
∑
i |zi| for any feasible direction z and v′t(x; z) ≤ 12β
∑
i |zi| for any feasible
direction z in H.
Proof. The statements for (ut(·)) and (vt(·)) follow from Lemma 3.5 and 3.8 and
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induction. Consequently, an optimal policy for each period is provided by Theo-
rem 3.1, and the no-repositioning set can be characterized as in Proposition 3.2,
3.3 and Corollary 3.4.
In what follows, we provide a result concerning the differentiability of the
functions (ut(·)) and (vt(·)) in the multi-period problem.
Proposition 3.10. Suppose µt is absolutely continuous and Ωut(I) ⊂ A◦I for
I ∈ (0, N) for each t. Then ut(·) and vt(·) are differentiable in S◦ for each t.
Proof. Suppose vt+1(·) is differentiable in S◦ and y ∈ S◦. Then Ut(·,d,p) is
differentiable at y for almost every (d,p). (The set of points {(d,p) : di =
yi for some i} in which Ut(·,d,p) is not differentiable in y has Lebesgue measure 0,
and hence has measure 0 under µt.) Note that Lemma 3.12 implies that Ut(·,d,p)
is Lipschitz with a Lipschitz constant nβ for all (d,p). So, by the Domintated
Convergence Theorem, ∂ut
∂yi
(y) =
∫
∂Ut
∂yi
(y,d,p) dµt. This implies that ut(·) is
differentiable at y. (As ut(·) is convex, the partial derivatives are continuous.)
Therefore, we conclude that ut(·) is differentiable in S◦ if vt+1(·) is differentiable
in S◦. The rest of the proof follows from Proposition 3.7 and induction.
We have shown that the optimal policy for the multi-period problem has the
same form as the one-period problem. In the remainder of this section, we show
that the same can be said about the stationary problem with infinitely many
periods. In such a problem, we denote the common distribution for (dt,pt) by
µ. Similarly, we denote the common values of Lt(·), lt(·) and rt(·) by L(·), l(·)
and r(·), respectively. We use pi to denote a stationary policy that uses the same
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decision rule pi in each period. Under pi, the state of the process is a Markov
random sequence (Xt : t = 1, 2, . . .). The optimization problem can be written as
V (x) = min
pi
Epix
{ ∞∑
t=1
ρt−1r(Xt, pi(Xt))
}
, (3.31)
where X1 = x a.e. is the initial state of the process. Let
VT (x) = minpi
Epix
{
T∑
t=1
ρt−1r(Xt, pi(Xt))
}
(3.32)
denote the value function of a stationary problem with T periods. It is well
known that the functions VT (·) converges uniformly to V (·) and V (·) is the unique
solution3 to
V (x) = min
y∈AI
r(x,y) + ρ
∫
V (τ(y,d,p)) dµ. (3.33)
Similar to the multi-period problem, the problem to be solved in each period can
be reduced to the one-period problem (3.16)
V (x) = min
y∈AI
C(y − x) + u(y),
where u(y) =
∫
U(y,d,p) dµ and U(y,d,p) = L(y,d) + ρV (τ(y,d,p)).
Theorem 3.11. The function u(·) is convex and continuous in S, with u′(y; z) ≤
β
∑
i |zi| for y ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn. The no-repositioning set Ωu(I) is nonempty, con-
nected and compact for all I ∈ [0, N ], and can be characterized as in Proposition
3.2, 3.3 and Corollary 3.4. An optimal policy pi∗ = (pi∗, pi∗, . . .) to the stationary
3The reason for this, in short, is that the pointwise minimization in (3.33) defines a contraction
operator on the space of bounded measurable functions on S, with V (·) being the unique fixed
point of this operator and VT (·) a Cauchy sequence that converges to V (·). For details, the
reader may refer to Chapter 6 of Puterman [1994].
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problem with infinitely many periods satisfies
pi∗(x) = x if x ∈ Ωu(I);
pi∗(x) ∈ ∂Ωu(I) if x /∈ Ωu(I).
(3.34)
The value function V (·) is convex and continuous in S, with V ′(x; z) ≤ β∑i |zi|
for any feasible direction z and V ′(x; z) ≤ 1
2
β
∑
i |zi| for any feasible direction z
in H.
Proof. As VT (·) converges uniformly to V (·), the value function V remains to be
convex and continuous. By Lemma 3.12, VT is Lipschitz and satisfies |VT (x2) −
VT (x1)| ≤ β
∑
i |x2,i−x1,i| and |VT (x2)−VT (x1)| ≤ β2
∑
i |x2,i−x1,i| for x2−x1 ∈
H. Both of these inequalities are preserved by uniform convergence. It follows that
|V (x+sz)−V (x)
s
| ≤ β∑i |zi| for any feasible direction z and |V (x+sz)−V (x)s | ≤ β2 ∑i |zi|
for any feasible direction z in H. Therefore, the statement for V (·) follows from
taking limits on both sides of these inequalities. The rest of the proof follows from
Lemma 3.8, Theorem 3.1, Proposition 3.2, 3.3 and Corollary 3.4
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3.A Proofs
Lemma 3.12. Suppose u : S → R is convex and continuous, and u′(x; z) ≤
β
∑
i |zi| for x ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn. Then, (i) |u′(x; z)| ≤ β
∑
i |zi| for any feasible
direction z at x ∈ S; (ii) u(·) is Lipschitz satisfying |u(x2)−u(x1)| ≤ β
∑
i |x2,i−
x1,i|; and (iii) ∂u(x) is nonempty for x ∈ S.
Proof. We first show that (i) is true. Suppose x ∈ S◦ and z ∈ Rn. Then,
−β∑i |zi| ≤ −u′(x;−z) ≤ u′(x; z) ≤ β∑i |zi|. So ,we have |u′(x; z)| ≤ β∑i |zi|
for x ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn.
To show that the inequality holds for x ∈ ∂S, first suppose x + sz ∈ S◦ for
small enough s > 0. Let φ(s) = u(x + sz). Then, |φ′(s+)| = |u′(x + sz; z)| ≤
β
∑
i |zi| for small enough s > 0. As the right derivative of a continuous convex
function is continuous, we have |u′(x; z)| = |φ′(0+)| ≤ β∑i |zi|. Let y = x+ sz.
Then, by the subgradient inequality, u(y) − u(x) = φ(s) − φ(0) ≥ sφ′(0+) =
su′(x; z) and, on the other hand, u(x) − u(y) = φ(0) − φ(s) ≥ −sφ′(s−) =
su′(y;−z). Therefore, su′(x; z) ≤ u(y) − u(x) ≤ −su′(y;−z). So, we also have
|u(x+ sz)− u(x)| = |u(y)− u(x)| ≤ sβ∑i |zi|.
Now, suppose x+sz ∈ ∂S for small enough s > 0. Take w such that x+s(z+
w) ∈ S◦ for small enough s > 0. Then u(x+sz)−u(x)
s
= u(x+sz)−u(x+s(z+w))
s
+
u(x+s(z+w))−u(x)
s
. Taking limits on both sides yields lim inf u(x+sz)−u(x+sz+sw)
s
+
u′(x; z+w) ≤ u′(x; z) ≤ lim sup u(x+sz)−u(x+sz+sw)
s
+u′(x; z+w). So, we have
−2β∑i |wi| − β∑i |zi| ≤ u′(x; z) ≤ 2β∑i |wi| + β∑i |zi|. As ∑i |wi| can be
arbitrarily small, we must have |u′(x; z)| ≤ β∑i |zi| for any feasible direction z
at x ∈ S.
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To show that u(·) is Lipschitz, suppose x and y are in S. Let z = y − x.
Then, by the subgradient inequality, u(y) − u(x) ≥ u′(x; z) and, on the other
hand, u(x)−u(y) ≥ u′(y;−z). So, we have u′(x; z) ≤ u(y)−u(x) ≤ −u′(y;−z),
and therefore, |u(y)− u(x)| ≤ β∑i |zi| = β∑i |yi − xi|. This implies that u(·) is
Lipschitz (as all the norms are equivalent on finite dimensional spaces).
To show that ∂u(x) 6= ∅, first suppose x ∈ S◦. In this case, it is well known
that ∂u(x) 6= ∅. By the subgradient inequality, ∂u(x) ⊂ Πi[−u′(x;−ei), u′(x; ei)],
where (ei : i = 1, . . . , n) is the standard basis of Rn. Therefore, by assumption,
∂u(x) ⊂ [−β, β]n for x ∈ S◦. This implies that ∂u(x) 6= ∅ for x ∈ ∂S, since the
subgradient map x 7→ ∂u(x) has a closed graph if u(·) is closed (See Rockafellar
[1970] Theorem 24.4).
Lemma 3.13. Suppose y0−x0 ∈ dom(C) and x0+tx ∈ S for small enough t > 0.
Then there exists y with
∑
i |y|i ≤
∑
i |x|i such that (y0+ty)−(x0+tx) ∈ dom(C)
and C((y0 + ty)− (x0 + tx)) ≤ C(y0 − x0) for small enough t.
Proof. It suffices to assume t is small enough such that y0,j + txj > 0 for all
y0,j > 0. If y0,j + txj ≥ 0 for all j, then we may simply set y = x and be done
with it. Otherwise, there exists j such that y0,j + txj < 0, or equivalently, y0,j = 0
and xj < 0. So, we assume J = {j : y0,j = 0, xj < 0} is nonempty. Note that
J ⊂ {j : y0,j = 0} ⊂ {j : y0,j − tx0,j ≤ 0}
Property 3.2 suggests that there exists z0 ≥ 0 such that cz0 = C(y0 − x0)
and
y0,j − x0,j =
 −
∑
i z0,j,i for j ∈ {j|y0,j − x0,j ≤ 0};∑
i z0,i,j for j ∈ {j|y0,j − x0,j > 0}.
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Let y be such that
yj =

0 for j ∈ J ;
xj for j ∈ {j|y0,j − x0,j ≤ 0}\J ;∑
i∈J
xi
x0,i
z0,i,j + xj for j ∈ {j|y0,j − x0,j > 0}.
We claim that y satisfies the desired properties.
First, note that
∑
j z0,i,j = x0,i for i ∈ J . So, we have
∑
j |y|j ≤
∑
j /∈J |xj| +∑
j
∑
i∈J
z0,i,j
x0,i
|xi| =
∑
j |x|j. Similarly, we have
∑
j yj =
∑
j xj. Therefore, to
show that (y0+ ty)− (x0+ tx) ∈ dom(C), we need to verify that y0,j + tyj ≥ 0 for
all j. This is definitely true for j ∈ J . By assumption, y0,j + txj ≥ 0 for j /∈ J . So,
y0,j + tyj ≥ 0 is also true for {j|y0,j −x0,j ≤ 0}\J . For {j|y0,j −x0,j > 0}, we have
x0,j + txj ≥ 0 ( txjx0,j ≥ −1). It follows that y0,j −x0,j +
∑
i∈J
txi
x0,i
z0,i,j ≥ y0,j −x0,j −∑
i∈J z0,i,j ≥ 0. Summing the two inequalities up yields y0,j+
∑
i∈J
txi
x0,i
z0,i,j+txj ≥
0.
To show that C((y0 + ty)− (x0 + tx)) ≤ C(y0 − x0), let z be such that
zi,j =
 (1 +
txi
x0,i
)z0,i,j for i ∈ J ;
z0,i,j for i /∈ J.
Then, we have 0 ≤ zi,j ≤ z0,i,j and (y0,j + tyj)− (x0,j + txj) =
∑
i zi,j −
∑
i zj,i for
all j. (For i ∈ J , (y0,i + tyi)− (x0,i + txi) = y0,i − x0,i − txi = −(
∑
j z0,i,j + txi) =
−∑j zi,j. For i ∈ {j|y0,j − x0,j ≤ 0}\J , (y0,i + tyi) − (x0,i + txi) = y0,i − x0,i =
−∑j z0,i,j = −∑j zi,j. For i ∈ {j|y0,j − x0,j > 0}, (y0,i + tyi) − (x0,i + txi) =
y0,i − x0,i +
∑
j∈J
txi
x0,i
z0,j,i =
∑
j z0,j,i +
∑
j∈J
txi
x0,i
z0,j,i =
∑
j zj,i.) It follows that z
is a feasible solution to (3.1) with (y0 + ty) in place y and (x0 + tx) in place of
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x. Therefore, we have C((y0 + ty)− (x0 + tx)) ≤ cz ≤ cz0 = C(y0 − x0). The
proof is complete.
Proposition 3.14. A function f : (a, b) → R is convex if and only if it is con-
tinuous with increasing left- or right-derivative.
Proof. The “only if” part is clear. For the “if part”, we assume f is continuous
with increasing right-derivative, for the proof for left-derivative is similar. It is
common knowledge that a function on an open set in Rn is convex if and only if
there exists a subgradient at every point. So, it suffices to show that f ′(x+) is a
subgradient at x for every x ∈ (a, b). Let gx(y) = f ′(x+)(y − x) + f(x). We need
to show that f(y) ≥ gx(y) for y ∈ (a, b).
We first show that f(y) ≥ gx(y) if f ′(x+) is strictly increasing. To show this,
let hx(y) = gx(y) −  for some  > 0. We claim that f(y) ≥ hx(y). Suppose this
is not ture. Then there exists z ∈ (a, b) such that (f − hx)(z) < 0. If z > x, let
c = sup{d ≥ x|(f −hx)(y) ≥ 0 for y ∈ [x, d]}. Note that, by continuity, x < c < z
and (f − hx)(c) = 0; and, by construction, for any d > c there exists y ∈ (c, d)
such that (f − hx)(y) < 0. So, there exists a decreasing sequence yn such that
yn → c and (f −hx)(yn) < 0. It follows that (f −hx)′(c+) = f ′(c+)−f ′(x+) ≤ 0.
This contradicts the assumption that f ′(·) is strictly increasing. On the other
hand, if z < x, let c = inf{d ≤ x|(f − hx)(y) ≥ 0 for y ∈ [d, x]}. Then z < c < x,
(f − hx)(c) = 0, and there exists a decreasing sequence yn such that yn → c
and (f − hx)(yn) ≥ 0. Therefore, (f − hx)′(c+) = f ′(c+) − f ′(x+) ≥ 0. This
again contradicts the assumption that f ′(·) is strictly increasing. So, we conclude
f(y) ≥ hx(y). As  can be arbitrarily small, we must have f(y) ≥ gx(y).
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Now, suppose f ′(x+) is increasing, and let h(x) = f(x) + 
2
x2 for some  >
0. Then h′(x+) is strictly increasing. By the first part of the proof, h(y) =
f(y) + 
2
y2 ≥ h′(x+)(y − x) + h(x) = (f ′(x+) + x)(y − x) + f(x) + 
2
x2 =
gx(y) + x(y − x) + 2x2. Letting → 0 on both sides, we have f(y) ≥ gx(y). The
proof is complete.
Proposition 3.15. Suppose E ⊂ Rn is convex, f : E → R is continuous, the
set of polyhedrons E1, . . . , Em is a partition of E, and f is convex on each of
E1, . . . , Em. Then f is convex if and only if −f ′(x;−z) ≤ f ′(x; z) for x ∈ E for
z ∈ Rn.
Proof. The “only if” part is always true for a convex function on Rn. For the “if
part”, note that g : (a, b)→ R is convex iff it is continuous with increasing left- or
right-derivative. (For a proof, see Proposition 3.14 in the Appendix.) It follows
that if g : [a, b] → R is continuous and piecewise convex on [a0, a1], [a1, a2], . . .,
[am−1, am], where a = a0 < · · · < am = b, then to show g is convex, we only need
to show that g′(x−) ≤ g′(x+) for x ∈ [a, b]. To apply this argument to f , note
that f is convex if φ(s) = f(y + sz) is convex as a function of s for each y ∈ E
and z ∈ Rn. As E is convex, the domain of φ(·) is an interval J ⊂ R. As s
varies in J , y + sz intersects with E1, . . . , Em for s in (possibly empty) intervals
J1, . . . , Jm, respectively. As E1, . . . , Em forms a partition of E, J1, . . . , Jm forms a
partition of J . It follows that φ(s) is piecewise convex. Therefore, φ(s) is convex
if φ′(s−) ≤ φ′(s+) for s ∈ J . Set x = y + sz, then φ′(s−) = −f ′(x;−z) and
φ′(s+) = f ′(x; z). It follows that −f ′(x;−z) ≤ f ′(x; z) implies f is convex.
Proof of Lemma 3.8: We omit the subscript t since there will be no ambiguity.
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It is easy to see that the continuity of u(·) follows from the Dominated Convergence
Theorem, as Ud,p(y) ≤ β
∑
i di+ρ‖v‖u, where ‖·‖u is the uniform norm. From our
discussion, it remains to be shown that −U ′d,p(y;−z) ≤ U ′d,p(y; z) and U ′d,p(y; z) ≤
β
∑
i |zi| for y ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn. To do this, for y ∈ Rn, we let J−(y) = {i|yi < 0},
J0(y) = {i|yi = 0}, and J+(y) = {i|yi > 0}.
Suppose y ∈ S◦ so that every direction z ∈ Rn is feasible. We first derive
U ′d,p(y; z) and U
′
d,p(y;−z). Note that
L(y,d) = β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)
(di − yi),
and
xi(y) =
 (yi − di) + pi(N −
∑
j∈J+(y−d)(yj − dj)) for i ∈ J+(y − d),
pi(N −
∑
j∈J+(y−d)(yj − dj)) for i ∈ J0(y − d) ∪ J−(y − d).
If t is small enough, then J−(y + tz − d) = J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J−(z)),
J0(y + tz − d) = J0(y − d) ∩ J0(z), and J+(y + tz − d) = J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y −
d) ∩ J+(z)). So for y + tz, we have
L(y + tz,d) = β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))
(di − yi − tzi),
and
xi(y + tz)
=
 (yi + tzi − di) + pi(N −
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z))(yj + tzj − dj)) i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J+(z)),
pi(N −
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z))(yj + tzj − dj)) i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J−(z) ∪ J0(z))).
Similarly, if t is small enough, J−(y− tz−d) = J−(y−d)∪ (J0(y−d)∩J+(z)),
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J0(y − tz − d) = J0(y − d) ∩ J0(z), and J+(y − tz − d) = J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y −
d) ∩ J−(z)). So for y − tz, we have
L(y − tz,d) = β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z))
(di − yi + tzi),
and
xi(y − tz)
=
 (yi − tzi − di) + pi(N −
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))(yj − tzj − dj)) i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J−(z)),
pi(N −
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))(yj − tzj − dj)) i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J+(z) ∪ J0(z))).
It follows that
L(y + tz,d)− L(y,d) = −βt
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))
zi,
and
L(y − tz,d)− L(y,d) = βt
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z))
zi.
We also have
xi(y + tz)− xi(y)
=
 tzi − pit
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J+(z)),
−pit
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J−(z) ∪ J0(z))),
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and
xi(y − tz)− xi(y)
=
 −tzi + pit
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z)) zj i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J−(z)),
pit
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z)) zj i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J+(z) ∪ J0(z))).
Set
w+ =
x(y + tz)− x(y)
t
, w− =
x(y − tz)− x(y)
t
.
Then
(v ◦ x)′(y; z) = v′(x;w+), (v ◦ x)′(y;−z) = v′(x;w−).
It follows that
U ′d,p(y; z) = −β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))
zi + ρv
′(x;w+),
and
U ′d,p(y;−z) = β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z))
zi + ρv
′(x;w−),
where
w+i =
 zi − pi
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J+(z)),
−pi
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J−(z) ∪ J0(z))),
and
w−i =
 −zi + pi
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z)) zj i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J−(z)),
pi
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z)) zj i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J+(z) ∪ J0(z))).
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To show Ud,p(·) is convex, let v+ and v− be such that
v+i =

zi
∑
j pj + pi
∑
j∈(J0(y−d)∩J−(z)) zj − pi
∑
j∈(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J0(y − d) ∩ J+(z),
−zi
∑
j pj + pi
∑
j∈(J0(y−d)∩J−(z)) zj − pi
∑
j∈(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J0(y − d) ∩ J−(z),
pi
∑
j∈(J0(y−d)∩J−(z)) zj − pi
∑
j∈(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i in elsewhere,
and
v−i =

zi(1−
∑
j pj) for i ∈ J0(y − d) ∩ J+(z),
−zi(1−
∑
j pj) for i ∈ J0(y − d) ∩ J−(z),
0 for i in elsewhere.
It is easy to see that v+ + v− = w+ + w− and v+ ∈ H, where H is defined by
(3.21). So, by Corollary 3.6, we have
U ′d,p(y; z) + U
′
d,p(y;−z) = β
∑
J0(y−d)
|zi|+ ρ(v′(x;w+) + v′(x;w−))
≥ β
∑
J0(y−d)
|zi|+ ρv′(x;v+ + v−)
≥ β
∑
J0(y−d)
|zi| − ρβ(1
2
∑
i
|v+i |+
∑
i
|v−i |)
≥ β
∑
J0(y−d)
|zi| − ρβ(
∑
j
pj
∑
i∈J0(y−d)
|zi|+ (1−
∑
j
pj)
∑
i∈J0(y−d)
|zi|)
≥ (1− ρ)β
∑
J0(y−d)
|zi|.
Therefore, Ud,p(·) is convex on S◦. Since S is locally simplicial, the continuous
extension of Ud,p(·) from S◦ to S must be convex. (See for example Rockafellar
[1970] Theorem 10.3.) Therefore, u(·) is convex.
To show that U ′d,p(y; z) ≤ β
∑
i |zi| for y ∈ S◦ for z ∈ Rn, let v+ and v− be
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such that
v+i =
 zi
∑
j pj − pi
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J+(z)),
−pi
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z)) zj i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J−(z) ∪ J0(z))),
and
v−i =
 zi(1−
∑
j pj) if i ∈ J+(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ J+(z)),
0 if i ∈ J−(y − d) ∪ (J0(y − d) ∩ (J−(z) ∪ J0(z))).
Then v+ + v− = w+ and v+ ∈ H. It follows from Corollary 3.6 that
U ′d,p(y; z) = −β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))
zi + ρv
′(x;w+)
≤ β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))
|zi|+ ρ(v′(x;v+) + v′(x;v−))
≤ β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))
|zi|+ ρβ(1
2
∑
i
|v+i |+
∑
i
|v−i |)
≤ β
∑
i∈J−(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J−(z))
|zi|+ ρβ((
∑
j
pj + (1−
∑
j
pj))
∑
j∈J+(y−d)∪(J0(y−d)∩J+(z))
|zi|)
≤ β
∑
i
|zi|
So, U ′d,p(y; z) ≤ β
∑
i |zi| holds for each y ∈ S◦ and z ∈ Rn. By Lemma 3.12 in
the Appendix, this implies Ud,p(·) is Lipschitz with a Lipschitz constant nβ for all
(d,p). It follows that u′(y; z) =
∫
U ′d,p(y; z) dµ ≤ β
∑
i |zi|. We are done. 
Chapter 4
Concluding Comments and
Future Research
In the first part of the thesis, we described an equilibrium model of P2P product
sharing or collaborative consumption. We characterized equilibrium outcomes,
including ownership and usage levels, consumer surplus, and social welfare. We
compared each outcome in systems with and without collaborative consumption
and examined the impact of various problem parameters including rental price,
platform’s commission rate, cost of ownership, owner’s extra wear and tear cost,
and renter’s inconvenience cost. Our findings indicate that collaborative consump-
tion can result in either higher or lower ownership and usage levels, with higher
ownership and usage levels more likely when the cost of ownership is high. We
showed that consumers always benefit from collaborative consumption, with indi-
viduals who, in the absence of collaborative consumption, are indifferent between
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owning and not owning benefitting the most. We studied both profit maximiz-
ing and social welfare maximizing platforms and compared equilibrium outcomes
under both in terms of ownership, usage, and social welfare. We found that a not-
for-profit platform would always charge a lower price and, therefore, lead to lower
ownership and usage than a for-profit platform (suggesting that a regulator may
be able to nudge a for-profit platform toward outcomes with higher social welfare
by putting a cap on rental price). We also showed that the platform’s profit is
not monotonic in the cost of ownership, implying that a platform is least prof-
itable when the cost of ownership is either very high or very low (suggesting that
a platform may have an incentive to affect the cost of ownership by, for example,
imposing membership fees or providing subsidies). In addition, we observed that
platform profit can be non-monotonic in the extra wear and tear cost, suggesting
that a for-profit platform may not have an incentive to eliminate this cost.
We described extensions of our analysis to several settings. In each case, we
confirmed the robustness of our main results, but also uncovered additional in-
sights. For example, for systems with a third party service provider, collaborative
consumption is more likely to lead to more ownership when the service level of
the third party service provider is higher. In settings where the platform may
own products, the platform would profit from these products only if the cost of
ownership and commission fee are sufficiently high. For the case where individuals
are heterogeneous in their sensitivity to extra wear and tear and inconvenience
(and similarly for the case where usage is endogenous), the impact of price on
ownership and usage is no longer monotonic. In settings where individuals with
higher usage are more prevalent, collaborative consumption is more likely to lead
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to less ownership than in settings where individuals with lower usage are more
prevalent.
In the second part of the thesis, we considered the inventory repositioning
problem in B2C product sharing networks, where demand, rental periods, and
return locations are stochastic. We formulated the problem as a Markov decision
process and showed that the problem to be solved in each period is one that
involves solving a convex optimization problem. We proved that the optimal
policy is specified in terms of a region in the state space, inside of which it is
optimal not to carry out any repositioning and outside of which it is optimal to
reposition inventory. We also proved that, in repositioning, it is always optimal
to do so such that the system moves to a new state that is on the boundary
of the no-repositioning region and provided a simple check for when a state is
in the no-repositioning region. We showed that, unlike many classical inventory
problems, the optimal inventory repositioning policy cannot be characterized by
simple thresholds in the state space. Moreover, the characterization of the no-
repositioning region and of the optimal cost function can be leveraged to improve
the efficiency at which the optimal policy can be computed.
Our work takes a first step toward the study of the impact of P2P product
sharing as well as the inventory management for B2C product sharing. It has
the potential to open up new directions for future research in the sharing and on-
demand economy. We mention a few examples. It would be interesting to consider
a setting where there is competition between a P2P platform and a B2C service
provider, with renters having the options of using one or both types of services. For
cars, such a scenerio has already unfolded in many places, where P2P platforms
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such as Turo and Getaround operate alongside B2C service providers such as
Zipcar and Car2go. However, it is unclear whether both types of services could
co-exist or either would prevail in the long run. A P2P platform could afford more
competitive pricing than a B2C service provider (because owners derive positive
utility from usage, they are willing to rent out their products at a lower price).
On the other hand, a B2C service provider may mitigate this disadvantage if it
could benefit from economies of scale. Given the fact that B2C service providers
have full control over their products, they could also more easily improve product
utilization and rental experience than a P2P platform. This could give rise to
a situation where under some conditions P2P rental dominates the market while
under other conditions B2C rental dominates. This could also lead to a situation
where the two types of services serve different market segments.
It would also be interesting to consider a setting where there is a duopoly com-
petition between two P2P product sharing platforms with multi-homing owners
and renters (i.e., they can participate in one or both of the platforms). Given that
the effective demand the platform would face is non-monotonic in price, competi-
tion may not necessarily lead to lower prices. This is also likely to have interesting
implications for product ownership, usage, consumer surplus and social welfare.
A related setting is where a decision maker can decide to be either a P2P
platform, a B2C service provider, or a hybrid of the two. This would provide
an answer to the question of whether B2C service providers have an incentive in
investing in a P2P platform. A B2C service provider could benefit from running
a P2P platform if the introduction of the platform could increase rental demand
while decreasing its spending on products. However, introducing P2P product
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sharing may also invite competition to its core business, which could negatively
impact its overall profit. Therefore, there could be conditions under which a B2C
service provider may or may not want to engage in peer-to-peer product sharing.
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